DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 349 217 SO 022 345

AUTHOR Malkasian, Mark; Davidson, Louise K.
TITLE In the Shadow of the Cold War: The Caribbean and Central America in U.S. Foreign Policy. Teacher's Resource Book.
INSTITUTION Brown Univ., Providence, RI. Center for Foreign Policy Development.
PUB DATE 91
NOTE 57p.; For a related document, see SO 022 344. A Project of the Choices for the 21st Century Education Project.
AVAILABLE FROM Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, Box 1948, Providence, RI 02912 ($5.00).
PUB TYPE Guides - Classroom Use - Teaching Guides (For Teacher) (052)

EDRS PRICE MF01 Plus Postage. PC Not Available from EDRS.
DESCRIPTORS Citizenship Education; Foreign Countries; *Foreign Policy; High Schools; Instructional Materials; *International Relations; Learning Activities; Social Studies; Teaching Guides; Teaching Methods; United States History
IDENTIFIERS Caribbean; Central America; *Cold War; Cuban Missile Crisis

ABSTRACT

With the improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations in recent years, there is much reason to take a fresh look at U.S. foreign policy. This teacher's resource book is designed to accompany a unit that provides high school students with an opportunity to examine U.S. policy toward the Caribbean and Central America. Composed of four chapters, the first chapter examines the economic and military concerns that linked the history of the Caribbean and Central America to the United States. Chapter 2 explains how differences with Cuba became entangled with the larger U.S.-Soviet confrontation in the early 1960s and focuses upon the Cuban Missile Crisis. The third chapter examines the last three decades of U.S.-Soviet-Cuban relations. Finally, the unit concludes with a chapter on the future of U.S. policy toward the Caribbean and Central America. In this section, students are asked to reflect on what they learned and choose one of three options for the future course of U.S. foreign relations toward the region. The teacher's resource book contains eight lessons to be taught in conjunction with the student text. Lessons 3-6 focus specifically on the dimensions of the triangular U.S.-Soviet-Cuban relationship, while lessons 1, 2, 7, and 8 largely explore the U.S. role in the Caribbean and Central America. The resource book also contains supplementary notes that feature additional background on the Cuban Missile Crisis, including much of the correspondence between Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro. (DB)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

ED340212

In the Shadow of the Cold War

The Caribbean and Central America in U.S. Foreign Policy

Teacher's Resource Book

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.

☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

A Project of the Choices for the 21st Century Education Project
Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE ONLY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
SUSAN GRASECK
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

SO 022 345

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

In the Shadow of the Cold War

The Caribbean and Central America in U.S. Foreign Policy

Teacher's Resource Book

Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University

Written by
Mark Malkasian

with
Louise K. Davidson

Cover and layout design by Richard Gann

Center for Foreign Policy Development
The Choices for the 21st Century Education Project
Brown University, Box 1948
Providence, Rhode Island 02912
(401) 863-3155

Copyright © by the Center for Foreign Policy Development. All rights reserved.

Introduction to Teachers

In the Shadow of the Cold War: The Caribbean and Central America in U.S. Foreign Policy was written to engage high school students in the consideration of important U.S. foreign policy issues. Teachers who have tested the unit in their own classrooms have found that *In the Shadow of the Cold War* is particularly useful in acquainting students with U.S. involvement in the Caribbean and Central America, and U.S.-Soviet relations. The range of lessons plans has been developed to accommodate both purposes. Lessons 3-6 focus specifically on the dimensions of the triangular U.S-Soviet-Cuban relationship, while Lessons 1, 2, 7, and 8 largely explore our country's role in the Caribbean and Central America. Together, the eight lessons serve to familiarize students with many of the most prominent themes of U.S. foreign policy, past and present.

The structure of the student text also incorporates two complementary approaches to U.S. foreign policy education. Chapters 1 and 3 cover the historical evolution of U.S. involvement in the Caribbean and Central America from the early nineteenth century to the present. In contrast, Chapters 2 and 4 allow students to step back from the flow of history and reflect on two critical questions: the lessons of the Cuban missile crisis and the future course of U.S. policy in the Caribbean and Central America. Again, the combination is intended to serve the broader goal of examining our country's role in the world. History offers students a context for understanding complex issues, while in-depth analysis enhances the appreciation of history.

Underlying the organization of *In the Shadow of the Cold War* is the pedagogical philosophy of the Choices for the 21st Century Education Project. In that regard, the lesson plans emphasize a belief in the value of collaborative learning, a recognition of the need to approach difficult questions from a variety of perspectives, and a commitment to active, participatory learning that critically engages students. This philosophy stems from the overarching commitment of the Choices Project, as an extension of the Center for Foreign Policy Development, to promote citizenship education through thoughtful discussion on important matters of U.S. foreign policy. As with all of the project's curricula, *In the Shadow of the Cold War* is ultimately designed to encourage students to assume responsible roles as citizens contributing to a democratic society.

Finally, the Teacher's Resource Book also contains supplementary notes. This section features additional background on the Cuban missile crisis, including much of the correspondence between Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro. The addendum on page thirty-three presents information on the missile crisis released in January 1992 and not included in the student text. Supplementary notes on Chapter 3 highlight key aspects of Cuban history since Castro's rise to power.

Acknowledgments

Like all publications of the Choices for the 21st Century Education Project, *In the Shadow of the Cold War: The Caribbean and Central America in U.S. Foreign Policy* was a collaborative effort among researchers of the Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University, staff members of the Choices Project, and classroom teachers.

This publication traces its roots to the work of James G. Blight, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Foreign Policy Development. Since 1986, Blight has studied the Cuban missile crisis through the oral histories of U.S., Soviet, and Cuban officials. Hundreds of hours of interviews have likewise provided Blight with a unique insight into the past, present, and future of U.S.-Soviet-Cuban relations. In almost every respect, *In the Shadow of the Cold War* owes its content and approach to the work of Blight, his chief collaborator and wife janet Lang, and Center research associates Aaron Belkin and David Lewis.

Other scholars at the Center were also invaluable, especially Mark Kramer and Stephen Shenfield. Director Mark Garrison and Research Director Richard Smoke offered thoughtful advice along every step of the textbook's development. Editorial associate Lorraine Walsh deserves special recognition for her patience and perseverance in shaping the unit. Outside of the Center, we are indebted to Christopher C. Coleman, Regina Cortina, and Cathy Schneider for lending their expertise on U.S. relations with Latin America.

Within the Choices Project, director Susan Graseck has served as the guiding spirit behind *In the Shadow of the Cold War*, while former curriculum coordinator Patricia Keenan was responsible for leading the publication through its initial stages. Gratitude also goes to Anne C. Prout, Karl Berger, Jacqui Deegan, and Bill Powers. Teachers who tested the unit in their classrooms contributed greatly to the revision of the textbook and lesson plans. In particular, we thank Edward J. Ahrens, Sr., Paul Cunningham, Ed Hands, Walter Monroe, Norm Shacochis, and Linda Trevorrow. For providing photographs, cartoons, and background material for *In the Shadow of the Cold War*, we thank Chuck Asay of the Colorado Springs Gazette Telegram, Mary Jane Camejo of Americas Watch, Jim Cedrone and Allan Goodrich of the John F. Kennedy Library, Laura Collins, Esperanza de Varona of the University of Miami, Maja Felaco of the Library of Congress, Devorah Goldburg of the Voice of America, Dawn Goldsmith, Dawn Hugh of the Historical Museum of Southern Florida, Fred Pernell of the National Archives, Bob Waller of the Department of Defense, Cynthia Williams of the Smithsonian Institute, and the reference department of the Brown University John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Library.

Exploring the U.S. Role in the World

Overview: In this lesson, students will consider principles underlying U.S. relations with other countries. Through brainstorming and discussion, students will first articulate what they already know about past U.S. involvement in foreign affairs. Students will then explore how U.S. problems have been linked to other countries and analyze the goals that have driven U.S. foreign policy. To conclude the lesson, students will examine the interests that have shaped our country's relationship with the Caribbean and Central America.

Time: One 45-minute class period

Reading Assignment/ Homework: None

Procedure:

1. Ask students to brainstorm about current problems facing the United States that involve other nations. As examples, suggest the U.S. trade deficit, the proliferation of chemical weapons, or illegal immigration. Ask prompting questions to guide the discussion toward a variety of problems. List each problem on the chalkboard and ask students to explain what they know about it. (As an alternative approach to sparking discussion, open the lesson by reading newspaper headlines from articles dealing with foreign policy.)

2. After a number of problems have been identified, ask students to identify the country or countries connected to each of the problems. List the countries next to the associated problems.

3. After listing several current problems for consideration, ask students to brainstorm for past examples of problems that required U.S. involvement with other nations. Encourage students to reflect on events from far back in American history. List these historical examples and have students explain the nature of U.S. interests at the time. (This should not become a detailed history lesson on any one event. A general overview is sufficient.) Direct the discussion to include a wide variety of historical examples.

4. Referring to these two lists, ask students to write four general statements expressing important goals and principles of U.S. foreign policy since World War II. Below are four examples:

--The United States seeks to promote free trade.
--The United States supports the growth of democracy.
--The United States opposes the spread of communism.
--The United States tries to keep other countries from intervening in the affairs of Latin America.

5. To conclude the lesson, ask students to identify the problems and statements most relevant to Latin America. Equally important, call on students to identify the interests that have dominated U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America. At this point, the focus of the class discussion should be turning toward the Caribbean and Central America. Explain that many of the problems and statements that have emerged are connected to U.S. relations with the Caribbean and Central America.

Lesson 2

U.S. Influence in the Caribbean and Central America

Overview: This lesson will provide students with a basic understanding of our country's past relationship with the Caribbean and Central America, and introduce students to important periods in the history of U.S. foreign policy. Students will work in small groups to research topics discussed in Chapter 1, and then plan a presentation for their classmates. In organizing their presentations, students will consider topics from the perspective of both the United States and the Caribbean/Central America.

Time: Two 45-minute class periods

Reading Assignment/Homework: The night before the lesson, students should skim Chapter 1 to the second paragraph on page sixteen, and review the timeline at the end of the chapter. Students will complete their presentations the night before the second class period.

Procedure:

1. Divide the class into four groups. Assign to each group one of the sets of topics listed below:

Group I
Manifest Destiny
Jacobo Arbenz

Group II
Spanish-American War
U.S.-Nicaraguan Relations from the 1850s to the 1930s

Group III
Panama Canal
Fulgencio Batista

Group IV
United Fruit Company
Cold War

2. Instruct students to locate information on each of the above topics in Chapter 1. (Students are also expected to make use of their social studies textbooks, or investigate library sources on each topic.) The groups should focus their research on preparing effective presentations. In addition to providing a factual overview, each group should explain how the goals and principles of U.S. foreign policy shaped the development of the topics under consideration. At the same time, each group is expected to interpret the significance of its topics from a Caribbean/Central American viewpoint. For example, in terms of U.S. foreign policy goals and principles, Manifest Destiny illustrated the American desire to expand across the continent and the nation's conviction in the uniqueness of American democracy. On the other hand, many people in the Caribbean and Central America view Manifest Destiny as an illustration of American arrogance and greed. Allow students one class period and one night of homework to prepare their presentations.

3. To begin the second class period of the lesson, ask each group to present its assigned topics and answer questions from classmates. Between presentations, provide additional background to bridge information gaps and review other important issues in the history of U.S. foreign policy. For example, explain the impact of isolationism on U.S. foreign relations during the interwar years.

4. *Extra Challenge*: Require students to summarize the main points from the presentation of each group. Summaries should be collected at the end of the second class period.

The United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba

Overview: In this lesson, students will explore the background of U.S.-Soviet-Cuban relations prior to the Cuban missile crisis. After reading sections of Chapters 1 and 2 and completing a study guide as homework, students will form small groups to respond to a worksheet of discussion questions from the perspective of either the United States, the Soviet Union, or Cuba in the early 1960s. Following small group work, students will share their responses to the discussion questions, evaluate the different perspectives of the three countries, then articulate their own views.

Time: One 45-minute class period

Reading Assignment/Homework: The night before the lesson, students should read from the second paragraph on page sixteen to the conclusion of Chapter 1 and the "Prelude to the Crisis" section (page twenty-two, Chapter 2). Along with the reading, students should complete the "The History of U.S.-Soviet-Cuban Relations" study guide.

Procedure:

1. Briefly review the study guide that students completed as homework.

2. Divide the class into groups of four or five students. Assign to each group the role of the United States, Cuba, or the Soviet Union. (In classes of more than fifteen students, each country may be represented by two groups.) Distribute the discussion questions, and ask the groups to respond from the perspective of their assigned country in the early 1960s. Explain that the purpose of the lesson is to explore the tensions in U.S.-Soviet-Cuban relations before the Cuban missile crisis. (Groups representing the Soviet and Cuban perspectives might have particular difficulty playing their roles. Alert them to sections of the text that explain the Soviet and Cuban viewpoints.) In each group, students should assume the roles of moderator, representative, recorder, and advisers to the representative. Below is an explanation of the purpose of each role:

> Moderator--makes sure that everyone participates in discussion.
>
> Representative--presents the views of the group to the entire class. Other group members may elaborate on the representative's presentation.
>
> Recorder--records the group's responses to the questions.
>
> Advisers--help representative prepare the presentation.

3. When the groups have completed their responses to the discussion questions, ask the representatives to present their responses to the entire class. Note the differences in interpretation among the three countries. Encourage students to challenge the interpretations of other groups. For example, urge the Soviets to question the motivation of the United States in organizing the Bay of Pigs invasion, or advise the United States to demand that Cuba provide an explanation of its economic program.

4. *Extra Challenge:* As homework, instruct students to apply what they have learned in class to answer the discussion questions from their own viewpoint. Emphasize that there are no right or wrong answers, but that students will be evaluated on the coherence of their responses.

Name:_____

The History of U.S.-Soviet-Cuban Relations
Study Guide

1. What role did the United States play in the Cuban struggle for independence from Spain?

2. Why did Fulgencio Batista lose his grip on power in Cuba during the 1950s?

3. How did Fidel Castro rise to power in Cuba?

4. Why did Castro's policies from 1959 to 1961 anger the United States?

5. Why was the failure of the invasion at the Bay of Pigs considered a humiliating defeat for the United States?

6. How did the Bay of Pigs invasion affect Cuba's relationship with the United States and the Soviet Union?

Name:_____

U.S.-Soviet-Cuban Relations
Discussion Questions

1. Assess the role of the United States in Cuba from the end of the Spanish-American War to 1901.

2. What were the reasons behind U.S. policy toward Fidel Castro during the first three years (1959-1961) of the Cuban revolution?

3. Evaluate Castro's domestic and foreign policies during 1959-1961.

4. What were the reasons behind the decision of the United States to support the Bay of Pigs invasion?

5. Explain why Cuba strengthened its ties with the Soviet Union after the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Cuban Missile Crisis

Overview: This simulation compels students to consider many of the same decisions that confronted the leaders of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba during the Cuban missile crisis. While working in small groups, students will carefully analyze the objectives and options of the three countries involved in the conflict in order to anticipate the actions of their classmates. The simulation will also allow them to improve their communication and negotiating skills.

Time: Two to three 45-minute class periods

Reading Assignment/Homework: The night before the simulation, students should read Chapter 2, paying particular attention to the options and objectives of the three countries involved in the Cuban missile crisis.

Procedure:

1. Divide the class into four groups. Three of the groups will represent the countries involved in the crisis while members of the fourth group will serve as mediators for the United Nations. Groups representing the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations should contain at least four members. Cuba, however, can be represented by as few as three students. (Students in this group should be particularly outspoken and articulate since the Cubans have fewer options and must rely more on negotiating skills.) Assign a role to each of the groups and distribute the appropriate handouts. (Everyone should receive "Introduction to the Cuban Missile Crisis." The *Secret and Confidential* information, however, should be distributed only to the members of the designated group.) Note that information on the handouts should not be shared with other groups. Organize the desks so that the Soviet and Cuban groups sit on one side of the room, the United States on the opposite side, and the United Nations in the middle. Position the groups as far apart as possible.

2. To recreate the tension of the crisis, read President Kennedy's speech to the nation of October 22, 1962. This will provide students with additional background on the crisis and focus them on a crucial moment of decision making. Following Kennedy's address, allow students a few minutes to review their handouts. Explain that the simulation requires that they understand the objectives and options of each country in order to anticipate the actions of their classmates. Chapter 2 of the student text is the source for this information. Before beginning the simulation, students should follow the instructions in "Organizing Your Group" and carefully examine "Crisis Rules."

3. When each of the groups understands its objectives and options, announce the start of the simulation. Explain that the activity may end as a result of a written agreement or decisive military action. A maximum time limit for the crisis (e.g., two class periods) should also be specified. Announce that there will be a break at the midway point of each class period to review the progress of the simulation and eliminate confusion. At this time, the United Nations will be called upon to report on the progress of negotiations.

4. To initiate the simulation, suggest that the United Nations send out liaisons to discuss ideas for treaty proposals with each of the groups. Explain that military action cannot be undertaken during the first twenty minutes of the simulation. (A U.S. naval blockade of Cuba is not considered a military action.) Inform the U.S. and Soviet groups that they must roll a die to determine the outcome of their military actions. Encourage the United States and the Soviet Union to seriously explore diplomatic options before pursuing military action. (Note that the Soviets have a nuclear option unknown to the other groups.) In general, the role of the teacher is to offer advice that promotes reasoned, well-informed decision making.

5. Following the simulation, ask students to guess the objectives and options of other groups. Discuss the actual objectives and options with the entire class, along with the historical outcome of the Cuban missile crisis. Compare the military superiority of the United States with the powerlessness of Cuba. Review the

role of nuclear missiles in the crisis, especially the apprehension that gripped both Kennedy and Khrushchev as conflict appeared imminent. Also point out areas in which the simulation did not completely reflect the facts of the crisis. The following examples are most noteworthy:

1. During the missile crisis, U.S. policymakers worked under the assumption that the Soviets had everything they needed in Cuba to launch nuclear missiles, although U.S. radiation sensors did not detect the presence of nuclear warheads on the island. For nearly three decades, the question of whether there were operational missiles in Cuba was not addressed by Soviet authorities. In January 1992, however, the chief of operations for Soviet forces in Cuba during the missile crisis said that there in fact were tactical nuclear missiles on the island ready for launch. (See page thirty-three of the Supplementary Notes for additional information on the status of Soviet missiles during the crisis.) For their part, Cuban officials assumed that the Soviet nuclear missiles on the island could be launched within a few hours notice or were in the final stages of preparation. The Cubans, though, were largely denied access to the missile sites. The blockade announced October 22, 1962, was aimed at limiting Soviet military operations in general rather than merely halting the installation of nuclear missiles in Cuba. At the time, U.S. officials imagined that the confrontation would continue for months and sought to prepare the public for a long struggle. Contemporary news reports affirm that the missile crisis was perceived as an extension of the conflict over West Berlin. Many in the Kennedy Administration fixed on the parallel between an outpost of the free world surrounded by communism and the lone Soviet ally in the Western Hemisphere.

2. The United Nations played little role in resolving the crisis. President Kennedy deliberately avoided the United Nations. He personally disliked U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, and believed that more could be accomplished outside of the international forum. Most of the critical communication between the United States and the Soviet Union took place through channels hidden from public view. Especially important were the meetings between Attorney General Robert Kennedy and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. From October 23 until October 28, 1962, Kennedy and Dobrynin held secret meetings after midnight. The meetings had no precedent in U.S. foreign policy history and were conducted without the knowledge of the U.S. State Department. Another intriguing link developed between Aleksandr Fomin, the KGB station chief in Washington, D.C., and senior ABC news reporter John Scali. The two met three times in different restaurants. During their conversations, Fomin suggested that the Soviets might consider removing their missiles from Cuba if the United States would do the same in Turkey. Scali took the proposal directly to his contact in the State Department. In this case, Fomin was operating independently of his embassy. During the heat of the crisis, Moscow permitted its officials a substantial amount of latitude to probe for potential areas of compromise with their U.S. contacts.

3. The Soviets genuinely feared that the United States would launch a nuclear strike against their country. Especially chilling was the fact that the U.S. Strategic Air Command used an open radio channel to announce the shift to DEFCON 2 on October 24, thus allowing the Soviets to listen in. Top Soviet officials responded by moving their headquarters to a bunker thirty feet below ground.

President John F. Kennedy's Speech to the Nation, October 22, 1962
(Reported in *The New York Times*, October 23, 1962)

This Government as promised has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military build-up on the island of Cuba.

Within the past week unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island.

The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere.

Upon receiving the first preliminary hard information of this nature last Tuesday morning at 9 A.M., I directed that our surveillance be stepped up. And having now confirmed and completed our evaluation of the evidence and our decision on a course of action, this Government feels obliged to report this new crisis to you in fullest detail.

The characteristics of these new missile sites indicate two distinct types of installations. Several of them include medium-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a distance of more than 1,000 nautical miles.

Each of these missiles, in short, is capable of striking Washington, D.C., the Panama Canal, Cape Canaveral, Mexico City or any other city in the southeastern part of the United States, in Central America or in the Caribbean area.

Additional sites not yet completed appear to be designed for intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of traveling more than twice as far, and thus capable of striking most of the major cities in the Western Hemisphere ranging as far north as Hudson's Bay, Canada, and as far south as Lima, Peru.

In addition, jet bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, are now being uncrated and assembled in Cuba while the necessary air bases are being prepared.

This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base by the presence of these large long-range and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas in flagrant and deliberate defiance of the Rio Pact of 1947, the traditions of this nation and hemisphere, the joint resolution of the 87th Congress, the Charter of the United Nations and my own public warnings to the Soviets on Sept. 4 and 13.

...

I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations.

I call upon him further to abandon this course of world domination and to join in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race and to transform the history of man.

He has an opportunity now to move the world back from the abyss of destruction by returning to his Government's own words that it had no need to station missiles outside its own territory, and withdrawing these weapons from Cuba; by refraining from any action which will widen or deepen the present crisis, and then by participating in a search for peaceful and permanent solutions.

Introduction to the Cuban Missile Crisis

You have just heard a speech to the nation delivered by President John F. Kennedy on October 22, 1962. The speech was given in the middle of the Cuban missile crisis--a thirteen-day contest of wills that brought the world closer to nuclear war than it has ever been. The Cuban missile crisis took place at a time when the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in a bitter struggle for global power. Communication between the two countries was poor. President Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev had little understanding of each other's intentions and goals. The establishment of a communist government in Cuba under Fidel Castro only added to the tension.

In this exercise, you and your classmates will go back in time to October 22, 1962. This is the day when President Kennedy publicly announced the U.S. response to the installation of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. Many of you will assume the roles of top officials in the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba while working in small groups. Each group will try to achieve the *objectives* listed on a sheet of secret and confidential information. Each group will make use of a limited number of *options* to achieve its objectives. In addition, some of you will serve as United Nations mediators and try to negotiate an end to the crisis.

In considering the actions of your group, you should use history as a guide to predict the objectives and options of the countries involved in the crisis. Your purpose, however, is to gain a better understanding of the Cuban missile crisis by facing for yourself the trying circumstances of 1962. You should learn the lessons of history, but do not feel bound by the outcomes of the past.

United States
Secret and Confidential

The U.S. Position: Your group represents the United States in the Cuban missile crisis. Your country is the strongest power on earth but you are increasingly challenged by the Soviet Union and its communist allies. On October 15, 1962, you discovered that the Soviets are attempting to install forty-three nuclear missiles on the island of Cuba. These missiles pose a threat to the United States that cannot be tolerated. Now, one week later, your group has come together to decide on the U.S. course of action.

Organizing Your Group: Your group should first choose a President. The job of the President is to take responsibility for making decisions after listening to the opinions of everyone in the group. Your President should appoint representatives of the State Department to pursue diplomatic options, and representatives of the Defense Department to pursue military options. Although everyone in your group shares the same objectives, State Department representatives are expected to encourage diplomacy while Defense Department representatives should suggest military action.

Crisis Rules: Any member of your group may negotiate at the United Nations, but only three members may leave your group's headquarters at any one time. No member may stay away from your group for more than fifteen minutes. Your group cannot undertake military action (Options 3-5) during the first twenty minutes of the simulation. Finally, the President is responsible for ensuring that all members of your group properly perform their roles.

U.S. Objectives: Your group's goal is to achieve as many of the following objectives as possible, either by signing agreements or by taking military action. Notice that your objectives have different point values.

5 points--Remove Soviet missiles from Cuba.

5 points--Remove Fidel Castro from power

5 points--Prevent nuclear weapons from striking the U.S.

3 points--Remove Soviet bombers from Cuba.

3 points--Prevent the Soviets from supplying Cuba by ship without imposing a naval blockade.

3 points--End Cuban support for revolutionary movements in Latin America.

3 points--End Soviet military aid to Cuba.

U.S. Options: Read through your options carefully to understand what the United States can do and what it cannot do. Notice that you have both diplomatic and military options. Options 2-5 may be exercised only once each.

1. The U.S. may pursue diplomacy to gain its objectives by negotiating with the Soviet Union and Cuba through the United Nations. You must conduct negotiations in the presence of a United Nations mediator. You cannot speak privately with representatives of the Soviet Union or Cuba.

To begin the negotiation process, your State Department representatives should write down proposals for an agreement based on U.S. objectives. For example, you might propose the following to open negotiations:

1. The Soviet Union agrees to remove its missiles from Cuba.
2. Cuba agrees to end support for revolutionary movements in Latin America.

Of course, don't expect the Soviets and Cubans to immediately accept your proposals. Once you begin negotiating at the United Nations, you will find that the Soviets and Cubans have their own proposals to present. The UN representatives should help you to develop an agreement that contains something attractive for everyone involved. Before your President signs anything, however, study the agreement to make sure that you have achieved some of your country's objectives.

2. The U.S. may impose a naval blockade of Cuba to prevent Soviet ships from bringing more military supplies to the island. At this stage, you are hoping that the Soviets have not yet delivered all of the military supplies to ready their missiles in Cuba for use.

3. The U.S. may use its air force to bomb the missile sites in Cuba. This option requires that you roll a die to determine the outcome of your action. The range of possible outcomes is as follows:

Six--You destroy the missile sites *and* Soviet bomber forces in Cuba.

Five--You destroy the missile sites.

Four--Three-fifths of the missile sites are destroyed.

Three--Two-fifths of the missile sites are destroyed.

Two--Your bombers miss their targets.

One--A number of your bombers are shot down by anti-aircraft weapons. The U.S. is unable to exercise non-nuclear military options for the remainder of the crisis.

4. The U.S. may invade Cuba with a force of 100,000 soldiers supported by air power. This option requires that you roll a die to determine the outcome of your action. The range of possible outcomes is as follows:

Six--You destroy the missile sites *and* Soviet bomber forces in Cuba *and* capture Fidel Castro.

Five--You destroy the missile sites *and* Soviet bomber forces in Cuba. Fidel Castro remains in control of most of the island.

Four--You destroy the missile sites. Fidel Castro remains in control of most of the island and has Soviet military forces to protect him.

Three--Bad weather forces you to call back your invasion force before it reaches Cuba.

Two-One--Your forces fail to advance beyond the landing area. The U.S. is unable to exercise non-nuclear military options for the remainder of the crisis.

5. The U.S. may launch a first strike of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. This option requires that you roll a die to determine the outcome of your action. The range of possible outcomes is as follows:

Six-Five--Your nuclear weapons destroy the capability of the Soviet military to retaliate and kill tens of millions of Soviets.

Four-One--Your nuclear weapons kill tens of millions of Soviets, but the Soviet retaliatory strike kills tens of millions of Americans.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Soviet Union
Secret and Confidential

The Soviet Position: Your group represents the Soviet Union in the Cuban missile crisis. Your country is the second strongest power on earth but you are still well behind the United States. You are attempting to install forty-three nuclear missiles in Cuba to even the balance of power and help protect the new communist government there. Your forces in Cuba have maintained complete control of Soviet military facilities on the island. On October 15, 1962, however, the United States discovered the missiles. Now, one week later, your group has just heard the speech of the U.S. President and has come together to decide on the Soviet Union's course of action during this crisis.

Organizing Your Group: Your group should first choose a General Secretary. The job of the General Secretary is to take responsibility for making decisions after listening to the opinions of everyone in the group. Your General Secretary should appoint representatives of the foreign ministry to pursue diplomatic options and representatives of the defense ministry to pursue military options. Although everyone in your group shares the same objectives, foreign ministry representatives are expected to encourage diplomacy while defense ministry representatives should suggest military action.

Crisis Rules: Any member of your group may negotiate at the United Nations or with Cuba, but only three members may leave your group's headquarters at any one time. No member may stay away from your group for more than fifteen minutes. Your group cannot undertake military action (Options 3-4) during the first twenty minutes of the simulation. Finally, the General Secretary is responsible for ensuring that all members of your group properly perform their roles.

Soviet Objectives: Your group's goal is to achieve as many of the following objectives as possible, either by signing agreements or by taking military action. Notice that your objectives have different point values.

5 points--Keep Soviet missiles in Cuba.

5 points--Ensure that the U.S. will not attack the communist government in Cuba.

5 points--Prevent U.S. nuclear weapons from striking the Soviet Union.

3 points--Supply Cuba by ship.

3 points--Remove U.S. nuclear missiles from Turkey.

3 points--Establish a permanent Soviet air base in Cuba.

3 points--Reduce U.S. military aid in Latin America by fifty percent.

Soviet Options: Read through your options carefully to understand what the Soviet Union can do and what it cannot do. Notice that you have both diplomatic and military options. Options 2-5 may be exercised only once.

1. The Soviet Union may pursue diplomacy to gain its objectives by negotiating with the United States and Cuba. Cuba is your ally, and you may speak directly with Cuban representatives at any time. On the other hand, you can negotiate with representatives of the United States only in the presence of a United Nations mediator.

To begin the negotiation process, your foreign ministry representatives should write down proposals for an agreement based on Soviet objectives. For example, you might propose the following to open negotiations:

1. The United States agrees not to attack the communist government in Cuba.
2. The United States agrees to remove nuclear missiles from Turkey.

Of course, don't expect the United States to immediately accept your proposals. Once you begin negotiating at the United Nations, you will find that the United States has its own proposals to present. The UN representatives should help you to develop an agreement that contains something attractive for everyone involved. Before your General Secretary signs anything, however, study the agreement to make sure that you have achieved some of your country's objectives.

2. The Soviet Union may send military supplies to Cuba by ship. These supplies are critical to installing your nuclear missiles on the island. You must wait thirty minutes after the start of the crisis before supplying Cuba. If the U.S. Navy does not impose a blockade within thirty minutes, you may make an announcement that your ships have successfully supplied Cuba.

3. If the U.S. Navy tries to stop your ships from bringing more military supplies to Cuba, the Soviet Union may challenge the blockade. In this case, you would have to engage U.S. ships in combat. This option requires that you roll a die to determine the outcome of your action. The range of possible outcomes is as follows:

Six--Attacks by your submarines and surface ships undermine the U.S. Navy's ability to enforce a blockade during the crisis. Your forces suffer losses but your military supply ships reach Cuba.

Five--Your military supply ships reach Cuba by evading the U.S. naval blockade.

Four--An equal number of Soviet and U.S. ships are sunk in battle but your military supply ships reach Cuba.

Three--Your naval commanders realize they are outnumbered and surrender to U.S. forces.

Two--Your naval forces are destroyed in battle.

One--Your naval forces are destroyed in battle. The Soviet air force stationed in Cuba is also destroyed while attempting to protect your ships.

4. **Secret Option:** The Soviet Union has tactical nuclear missiles in Cuba ready for launch. These missiles have a range of thirty miles, meaning that they cannot reach Florida but could be used to stop a U.S. invasion of Cuba. The other groups are not sure about the status of these missiles. You may announce your intention to launch tactical nuclear missiles only if the United States announces plans to invade Cuba. Use of the missiles would annihilate a U.S. invasion force before it could establish a base on the island. Be aware, however, that no country has used nuclear weapons since 1945. Launching tactical missiles against the United States could have catastrophic consequences.

5. The Soviet Union may launch a first strike of nuclear weapons against the U.S. This option requires that you roll a die to determine the outcome of your action. The range of possible outcomes is as follows:

Six--Your nuclear weapons kill millions of Americans and prevent the U.S. military from retaliating against you for twenty class minutes.

Five-One--Your nuclear weapons kill millions of Americans, but the U.S. retaliatory strike kills tens of millions of Soviets.

Cuba

Secret and Confidential

The Cuban Position: Your group represents Cuba in the Cuban missile crisis. A new government came to power in your country in 1959 under the leadership of Fidel Castro. Since that time, however, your relations with the United States have become worse and worse. Last year, the United States sponsored an invasion of Cuba to destroy your country's communist revolution. Fortunately, you have a powerful ally--the Soviet Union. The Soviets are attempting to install forty-three nuclear missiles in Cuba to help protect communism. On October 15, 1962, however, the United States discovered the missiles. Now, one week later, your group has just heard the speech of the U.S. President and has come together to decide on Cuba's course of action during this crisis.

Organizing Your Group: Your group should first choose a Prime Minister. The job of the Prime Minister is to take responsibility for making decisions after listening to the opinions of everyone in the group. The other members of your group will advise the Prime Minister and negotiate with the United States at the United Nations and with the Soviet Union.

Crisis Rules: Any member of your group may negotiate at the United Nations or with the Soviet Union, but only two members may leave your group's headquarters at any one time. No member may stay away from your group for more than fifteen minutes. You should know that the United States and Soviet Union cannot undertake military action during the first twenty minutes of the simulation. Finally, the Prime Minister is responsible for ensuring that all members of your group properly perform their roles.

Cuban Objectives: Your group's goal is to achieve as many of the following objectives as possible, either by signing agreements or by taking military action. Notice that your objectives have different point values.

5 points--Ensure that the U.S. will not attack the government of Fidel Castro.

5 points--Keep Soviet missiles in Cuba.

5 points--Prevent a U.S. attack from damaging Cuba.

3 points--Receive supplies from Soviet ships.

3 points--End the U.S. economic embargo against Cuba.

3 points--Forbid Cuban exiles in the U.S. from carrying out armed attacks against your government.

3 points--Turn over the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo to Cuba.

Cuban Options: Read through your options carefully to understand what Cuba can do and what it cannot do. Notice that you have possible military options, as well as diplomatic options.

1. Cuba may pursue diplomacy to gain its objectives by negotiating with the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is your ally, and you may speak directly with Soviet representatives at any time. On the other hand, you may negotiate with representatives of the United States only in the presence of a United Nations mediator.

To begin the negotiation process, the Prime Minister's advisers should write down proposals for an agreement based on Cuban objectives. For example, they might propose the following to open negotiations:

1. The United States agrees not to attack the government of Fidel Castro.
2. The United States agrees to end the economic embargo against Cuba.

Of course, your group should not expect the United States to immediately accept your proposals. Once your advisers begin negotiating at the United Nations, you will find that the United States has its own proposals to present. The UN representatives should help you to develop an agreement that contains something attractive for everyone involved. Before your Prime Minister signs anything, however, study the agreement to make sure that you have achieved some of your country's objectives.

2. Cuba may conduct a bombing raid on an American city in the Southeast. The raid would have only a symbolic impact and would not affect U.S. military capabilities. This option may be exercised only once.

3. Cuba may publicly threaten to attack the U.S. with nuclear weapons. This would be only a threat. In reality, the Soviets have maintained complete control of their missile facilities on your island. You are not even sure if the missiles in Cuba are ready for launch.

4. In the event of a U.S. attack against Cuba, you may try to persuade the Soviets to respond with nuclear weapons. Your Soviet allies may have not considered this option. You must decide whether or not to discuss this subject with them.

United Nations Mediators

Secret and Confidential

Objectives: Your group's goal is to try to bring this crisis to an end without military conflict. You should know that the countries involved have the ability to take military action. You should also know that each of the three groups will be pursuing a separate set of objectives. In some cases, the objectives of one country will conflict with the objectives of other countries. As United Nations mediators, you must work to find areas where countries can agree. Your chief objectives are to:

1. *Negotiate signed agreements to end the crisis.* Your agreements do not need to be signed by all three countries. You may be able to negotiate agreements between the U.S. and either the Soviet Union or Cuba. However, an agreement signed by three countries will be valued more highly by your teacher than an agreement between two countries.

2. *Conclude the crisis without military conflict.* You should try to engage all three countries in negotiation as soon as possible. Emphasize that they have more to gain by signing an agreement than by exercising military options. Your group's ability to prevent or minimize military conflict will be an important factor in the evaluation you receive.

Organizing Your Group: Your group should first choose a Secretary General. The job of the Secretary General is to assume the leading role in developing agreements. The Secretary General will be called upon to report the progress of negotiations at the midway point of each class period. The Secretary General should also assign one person in your group to work directly with the United States, another person to work with the Soviet Union, and a third person to work with Cuba. These three people will report proposals for agreements.

Procedure: The United Nations group will be located in the center of the classroom. You may send individuals out to negotiate with the three countries separately, or you may invite group representatives to the United Nations. To be valid, agreements must be signed by the leaders of the countries involved. An agreement will remain valid unless all of the signatories state in writing that the agreement is no longer valid. Agreements should be given to the teacher after they are signed.

Developing Agreements: To develop ideas for agreements, keep in mind what you have read in Chapter 2 about the objectives of each country. For example, you know from your reading that the United States could not accept the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. At the same time, both the Cubans and the Soviets wanted a guarantee that the United States would not attack Castro's government. Using this information, you could propose the following compromise:

The United States agrees not to attack Cuba if Soviet missiles are removed from the island.

By examining Chapter 2 more deeply, you will find other areas of potential compromise. The first step is to gain an understanding of what each country wants to achieve. Begin by making lists of probable objectives for the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba from the information in Chapter 2. This will help you draw up proposals that might lead to an agreement. Try to develop as many ideas for compromise as possible. That way, you will have a better chance of involving all three countries in a peaceful solution to the crisis.

Missile Crisis Documents--Honors

Overview: In this lesson, students will analyze and interpret the most important documents of the Cuban missile crisis. Students will read two letters addressed by Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, dated October 26 and October 27, 1962. In reviewing the two letters, students will not only sharpen their critical thinking skills while identifying crucial information but will also gain a greater insight into the decisions facing Kennedy and Khrushchev at the tense climax of the missile crisis. This lesson can be conducted either as an individual exercise or as a small-group activity.

Time: One 45-minute class period

Reading Assignment/Homework: The night before the lesson, students should read Khrushchev's October 26, 1962, and October 27, 1962, letters to Kennedy. (The letters are available on pages 37-42 of the Supplementary Notes.) When assigning the homework, explain that the first letter arrived in Washington the evening of October 26. Before Kennedy and his advisers had time to respond, a second letter arrived the morning of October 27. The letters contain differences in tone and substance. Students should put themselves in the place of President Kennedy as they consider the letters. As preparation for the homework, brainstorm with students to summarize the key policy objectives that guided Kennedy's decisions during the crisis. They should include:

1. Removing Soviet missiles from Cuba.
2. Honoring U.S. commitments to Turkey and other allies..
3. Avoiding an escalation of the crisis that could lead to war with the Soviets.

Explain that the lesson will require students to assume the role of President Kennedy in composing a response to Khrushchev's letters. To help them organize their approach, students should identify paragraphs in which Khrushchev indicates his terms for resolving the crisis. Warn students that Khrushchev's main points are not clearly stated, especially in the first letter. Suggest that students first read both letters in their entirety to gain a broad understanding of Khrushchev's proposals. They should then go back and highlight the passages in which Khrushchev delineates the Soviet position.

Procedure:

1. Begin the lesson by asking students to compare the styles of the two letters. Students should realize that the first letter has a more personal, emotional tone, as well as a style that is often rambling and disjointed. On the other hand, Khrushchev states his cases much more directly and succinctly in the second letter.

2. Remind students that they should have highlighted key paragraphs in the letters. Most important are paragraphs 16, 22, and 25 in the October 26 letter, and paragraphs 6, 7, 10, 12, and 13 in the October 27 letter. Some students may need help in identifying the key paragraphs.

3. Review the policy objectives guiding Kennedy. In developing a U.S. response to Khrushchev, students should try to adhere to the objectives as closely as possible. Instruct students that the first part of their assignment consists of writing a reply that outlines the main elements of a U.S. proposal to Khrushchev. Advise them that they will be evaluated on their ability to analyze Khrushchev's message and apply that interpretation to crafting an appropriate response. Following is an example:

> Dear Chairman Khrushchev:
>
> In the interest of preserving world peace, I propose the following:
>
> 1. The Soviet Union will immediately remove all missiles from Cuba.
>
> 2. Soviet military personnel in Cuba will immediately leave the island.

3. The United will pledge not to attack Cuba.

4. The United States will sponsor a meeting of the Organization of American States within the coming year to address the issue of safeguarding the security of Cuba.

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy

The second part of the assignment asks students to explain the reasoning behind their responses. This is the more demanding component of the exercise. Require that students cite passages from the Khrushchev letters in justifying their proposals. They should also refer to Chapter 2 in order to assess the relative strengths and weaknesses of the United States and the Soviet Union at the time of the missile crisis.

4. After collecting the completed assignments, ask students to share some of the ideas expressed in their proposals. Which passages of the Khrushchev letters most influenced their thinking? After discussing elements in the letters that might have shaped Kennedy's outlook, read Kennedy's actual response of October 27, 1962 (page forty-three of the Supplementary Notes). Remind students that most ExComm members did not believe Khrushchev would accept Kennedy's proposal. What were the factors that led Kennedy to address only the October 26 letter while ignoring the October 27 letter? What were the main differences in the substance of the two letters? Why did the United States refuse to consider Khrushchev's proposal in the October 27 letter to trade the removal of missiles from Cuba for the removal of missiles from Turkey? Review the comparison of the two letters conducted at the beginning of the period. Why did Kennedy and his advisers conclude that the first letter represented Khrushchev's personal sentiments while the second letter reflected a consensus of top Soviet leaders? (Some ExComm members saw the second letter as evidence of a power struggle within the Kremlin.) Ask students to assume Khrushchev's perspective in considering Kennedy's response. Should he have accepted Kennedy's offer? What were the primary concerns affecting his decision?

Fidel Castro from 1962 to 1991

Overview: In this lesson, students will analyze the major events and themes of U.S.-Soviet-Cuban relations from 1962 to 1991 as presented in Chapter 3 of the student text. By considering hypothetical statements of Fidel Castro, students will understand how changes in international affairs have influenced the outlook and strategy of the Cuban leader. This lesson can be conducted either as an individual exercise or as a small-group activity.

Time: One 45-minute class period

Reading Assignment/Homework: The night before the lesson, students should read Chapter 3. Note how Chapter 3 is divided into four different sections, each representing a different stage of U.S.-Soviet-Cuban relations and, in particular, Fidel Castro's foreign policy. Explain that students should read Chapter 3 in order to learn about the major events of each section and to gain a general understanding of how Castro's position has changed over time.

Procedure:

1. Before the lesson begins, write the following on the chalkboard:

> Castro 1--Exporting the Cuban Revolution
> Castro 2--The Soviet-Cuban Alliance
> Castro 3--Reagan Battles Communism
> Castro 4--New Relations in the Gorbachev Era

Inform students that you will distribute a worksheet listing thirteen statements that *could* have been made by Castro from 1962 to 1991. The job of the student is to match each statement with one of the four sections of Chapter 3 by writing Castro 1, Castro 2, Castro 3, or Castro 4 in the blank space beside the statement on the worksheet. (In advanced classes, students should not be allowed to refer to their textbook or notes.) Make it clear that statements reflect both the historical events described in Chapter 3 and Castro's overall position. In deciding on their answers, students should consider both the mood embodied in each statement and the specific factual clues presented. Offer the following example for further clarification:

> *Statement:* We will do everything in our power to defend the revolution of the Nicaraguan people against the military might of U.S. imperialism.
>
> *Answer:* Castro 3. Explain that the events of the statement correspond to the period of the Reagan Administration's support for the *contra* forces in Nicaragua, while the mood reflects Castro's eagerness to oppose U.S. interests in Central America.

If students are working in small groups, each group should appoint a leader responsible for reading the statements and recording the group responses on the worksheet. Insist that groups arrive at their answers through consensus rather than majority rule or a division of responsibility. Suggest that group members resolve disagreements by analyzing the reasons behind conflicting answers.

2. When the worksheet has been completed, call on students to give their answers to the entire class. Ask students to identify the historical event or key phrase in each statement that alerted them to the correct answer. If students are organized in small groups, read a statement and then ask each group to give its response. Make sure every group member is required to respond during the answer session.

Answer Key: 1.--Castro 3; 2.--Castro 1; 3.--Castro 4; 4.--Castro 1; 5.--Castro 4; 6.--Castro 2; 7.--Castro 3; 8.--Castro 4; 9.--Castro 2; 10.--Castro 3; 11.--Castro 4; 12.--Castro 1; 13.--Castro 2.

Hypothetical Statements by Fidel Castro

_____ 1. The invasion of Grenada by imperialist forces has shown us just how far the United States will go to destroy our allies.

_____ 2. The struggle of Ché Guevara will spread the fire of revolution to every corner of Latin America.

_____ 3. If the course of events makes Cuba the last communist nation on earth, I promise that the Cuban people will defend communism to our last drop of blood.

_____ 4. We will create an economy that changes how people feel about work. Forget the economic lessons of the past. The leadership of the revolution will guide Cuba to a glorious future.

_____ 5. The U.S. invasion of Panama is a sign that the United States will stop at nothing to crush its opponents.

_____ 6. The interests of Cuba and the Soviet Union are identical in strengthening the forces of communism around the world.

_____ 7. Central America is today the scene of a critical struggle. The *contra* rebels in Nicaragua and the government troops of El Salvador are nothing but an extension of the U.S. military.

_____ 8. The Soviet Union has betrayed both the values of communism and its allies.

_____ 9. Our African brothers have called upon us to join the struggle against imperialism in Angola. We are happy to fight by their side.

_____ 10. The progress of the Sandinista revolution toward socialism is a triumph for Cuba. We will continue to provide aid to the new government to ensure the success of the revolution.

_____ 11. I must warn the Cuban people that we face difficult times ahead. Many of our allies have fallen and our enemy to the north is seeking an opportunity to destroy us.

_____ 12. The Soviet Union does not understand the need for revolution in Latin America. We must act now to help overthrow corrupt, capitalist governments in Latin America.

_____ 13. We have made mistakes in our economic development. Now we must look to our Soviet friends for a helping hand.

United States in the Caribbean and Central America

Overview: This exercise requires students to analyze U.S. options on policy in the Caribbean and Central America from a variety of perspectives. Students will examine both the historical lessons of U.S. involvement in the region and the significance of recent world events in shaping the direction of our country's foreign policy. Students will be called upon to apply what they have learned to develop arguments and organize persuasive oral presentations. In the process, students will sharpen communication skills and engage in structured debate with their classmates.

Time: Two or three 45-minute class periods

Reading Assignment/Homework: The night before the lesson, students should read Chapter 4.

Procedure:

Day 1

1. Begin by asking students to reflect on what they have learned about U.S. policy goals in the Caribbean and Central America. What have been the most important U.S. interests in the region? How have U.S. interests and U.S. policies changed over time? Why has Cuba been the focus of U.S. concern in the region since Castro came to power? These questions are intended to draw attention to important shifts in our country's policies in the region. Note that these shifts reflect larger changes in the beliefs and values underlying the U.S. role in the world. Students should understand that each of the three options in Chapter 4 embodies a distinct view about the U.S. role in the world.

2. Divide the class into four groups. Three groups should contain four students. Each of these three groups will advocate one of the options on U.S. policy outlined in Chapter 4. The remaining students will serve as representatives of the U.S. State Department. Assign an option to each of the three groups and distribute the appropriate handouts. Also distribute handouts to the State Department representatives. Instruct the option groups to review the handouts and then to assign roles to group members. Each group will have a spokesperson, a cross-examiner, an expert on U.S. relations with the Caribbean and Central America, and an expert on national security. (See the student handouts for more information.) Students will be given the remainder of the period to prepare their presentations or, in the case of the State Department representatives, prepare questions for the option groups.

3. Make sure that members of the option groups understand their roles. The spokesperson will be expected to present the position of the option group to the State Department representatives. The cross-examiner will challenge the position of other option groups. The two experts will apply their respective areas of expertise to preparing the presentation of the spokesperson and providing ideas for challenging cross-examination questions. Option groups will probably need to complete their preparations as homework.

Days 2-3

1. Organize the room so that three clusters of four desks face a row set aside for State Department representatives. Explain that the exercise will begin with the presentations of the spokespersons of the three option groups. These presentations should not exceed five minutes. When the presentations have been completed, each of the option groups, beginning with Option I, will answer cross-examination questions. The cross-examiners from the other groups will be given the first opportunity to pose questions. Following this exchange, State Department representatives will ask questions. Any member of the option group under cross-examination may respond on behalf of the group. The role of the teacher in the exercise is to observe the time limits for the initial presentations and promote lively discussion among students. For example, no cross-examiner or State Department representative should be allowed to dominate the discussion with a long string of questions.

2. After all three options have been presented and debated, the State Department representatives will require a few minutes to consult with one another before deciding which of the three groups presented its case most effectively. The option groups may be asked to leave the room at this time.

3. Conclude the exercise by discussing the decision of the State Department representatives. Which arguments were most persuasive? Which group made the best use of historical evidence? Poll students on their personal preferences regarding the options. How would they define U.S. interests in the Caribbean and Central America? What beliefs about the U.S. role in the world would be reflected in a policy option of their own making?

4. Collect cross-examination questions and evaluation forms from the State Department representatives following the discussion.

Extra Challenge: As homework, ask students to write a letter to a member of Congress or an editor of a local newspaper expressing their ideas on the future direction of U.S. policy in the Caribbean and Central American. Emphasize that the letter should first present the most important underlying beliefs and values of the student and then outline specific policy steps.

Option I

Introduction: Your group believes that the United States should use its power to maintain stability in the Caribbean and Central America. Now that the United States has won the Cold War against the Soviet Union, we have an opportunity to wipe communism off the map in the Caribbean and Central America.

Your Assignment: Your assignment is to persuade representatives of the U.S. State Department to adopt Option I as our country's policy toward the Caribbean and Central America. Your presentation will be judged on how well you defend the policies of Option I. The State Department representatives will expect you to make use of historical examples from *In the Shadow of the Cold War.*

Organizing Your Group: Each of the four members of your group should be assigned a specific role. Below is a brief explanation of the responsibilities for each role:

1. *Spokesperson:* Your job is to summarize the policies of Option I and explain why Option I should be adopted by the State Department representatives. Your presentation should be based both on historical evidence and recent events. Review the *Arguments in Favor* section of Option I in Chapter 4. In preparing your presentation, you should expect help from your group's experts on U.S. relations with the Caribbean and Central America and national security. Your presentation should last no more than five minutes.

2. *Cross-Examiner:* Your job is to challenge the positions of Options II and III after the spokespersons have completed their presentations. While your spokesperson is developing Option I's presentation, you should be writing at least three questions to ask each of the other two groups. Your questions should be drawn from the *Arguments Against* section of Options II and III in Chapter 4. In preparing your questions, you should expect help from your group's experts on U.S. relations with the Caribbean and Central America and national security.

3. *Expert on National Security:* As an expert on this subject, you are especially concerned about the threat of communism to U.S. interests. In the Caribbean and Central America, you recognize that Cuba's long-standing alliance with communist guerrilla groups is the main source of that threat. You should carefully review *In the Shadow of the Cold War* to develop arguments supporting Option I's firm stance on protecting our country's national security.

4. *Expert on U.S. Relations with the Caribbean and Central America:* As an expert on this subject, you believe that the countries of the Caribbean and Central America benefit from a strong U.S. presence in the region. You recognize that our country's strength ensures stability and protects our country's interests. You are especially concerned about the threat of communism to the countries of the region. You should carefully review *In the Shadow of the Cold War* to develop arguments upholding Option I's conviction that the United States should serve as an international policeman in the Caribbean and Central America.

The Presentation: Your spokesperson will first present the case for Option I to the State Department representatives. The presentation should stress the strongest points of your case. Your spokesperson can make use of notes during the presentation but should try to speak clearly and convincingly. After all three of the option groups have completed their presentations, your cross-examiner will have an opportunity to challenge the positions of Options II and III. The goal of cross-examination is to point out weaknesses in the arguments of the other groups. Options II and III, as well as the State Department representatives, will also have a chance to cross-examine your group. Any member of your group may respond to these questions.

Option II

Introduction: Your group believes that the United States should use its wealth and influence to encourage the development of a prosperous economy and democratic institutions in the Caribbean and Central America. Only a policy that tackles the roots of the problems in the region will promote the long-term interests of the United States.

Your Assignment: Your assignment is to persuade representatives of the U.S. State Department to adopt Option II as our country's policy toward the Caribbean and Central America. Your presentation will be judged on how well you defend the policies of Option II. The State Department representatives will expect you to make use of historical examples from *In the Shadow of the Cold War.*

Organizing Your Group: Each of the four members of your group should be assigned a specific role. Below is a brief explanation of the responsibilities for each role:

1. *Spokesperson:* Your job is to summarize the policies of Option II and explain why Option II should be adopted by the State Department representatives. Your presentation should be based both on historical evidence and recent events. Review the *Arguments in Favor* section of Option II in Chapter 4. In preparing your presentation, you should expect help from your group's experts on U.S. relations with the Caribbean and Central America and national security. Your presentation should last no more than five minutes.

2. *Cross-Examiner:* Your job is to challenge the positions of Options I and III after the spokespersons have completed their presentations. While your spokesperson is developing Option II's presentation, you should be writing at least three questions to ask each of the other two groups. Your questions should be drawn from the *Arguments Against* section of Options I and III in Chapter 4. In preparing your questions, you should expect help from your group's experts on U.S. relations with the Caribbean and Central America and national security.

3. *Expert on National Security:* As an expert on this subject, you understand that communism and other threats to our national security thrive in an atmosphere of poverty and dictatorship. You believe that the United States can best promote its long-term national security by helping to build societies that are like our own. You should carefully review *In the Shadow of the Cold War* to develop arguments supporting Option II's plan to encourage democracy and free-market economics in the Caribbean and Central America.

4. *Expert on U.S. Relations with the Caribbean and Central America:* As an expert on this subject, you believe that encouraging economic growth and democracy in the Caribbean and Central America is far more effective than supplying more military aid to the region. You realize that the countries of the Caribbean and Central America can benefit from our help and guidance. In the long run, prosperity and democracy are the real answers to the region's problems. You should carefully review *In the Shadow of the Cold War* to develop arguments supporting Option II's program for a more hopeful future in the Caribbean and Central America.

The Presentation: Your spokesperson will first present the case for Option II to the State Department representatives. The presentation should stress the strongest points of your case. Your spokesperson can make use of notes during the presentation but should try to speak clearly and convincingly. After all three of the option groups have completed their presentations, your cross-examiner will have an opportunity to challenge the positions of Options I and III. The goal of cross-examination is to point out weaknesses in the arguments of the other groups. Options I and III, as well as the State Department representatives, will also have a chance to cross-examine your group. Any member of your group may respond to these questions.

Option III

Introduction: Your group believes that the United States should reduce its involvement in the Caribbean and Central America while normalizing our relations with Cuba. With billions of dollars in U.S. aid to the region already wasted, we should now encourage the countries of the Caribbean and Central America to deal with their own problems.

Your Assignment: Your assignment is to persuade representatives of the U.S. State Department to adopt Option III as our country's policy toward the Caribbean and Central America. Your presentation will be judged on how well you defend the policies of Option III. The State Department representatives will expect you to make use of historical examples from *In the Shadow of the Cold War.*

Organizing Your Group: Each of the four members of your group should be assigned a specific role. Below is a brief explanation of the responsibilities for each role:

1. *Spokesperson:* Your job is to summarize the policies of Option III and explain why Option III should be adopted by the State Department representatives. Your presentation should be based both on historical evidence and recent events. Review the *Arguments in Favor* section of Option III in Chapter 4. In preparing your presentation, you should expect help from your group's experts on U.S. relations with the Caribbean and Central America and national security. Your presentation should last no more than five minutes.

2. *Cross-Examiner:* Your job is to challenge the positions of Options I and II after the spokespersons have completed their presentations. While your spokesperson is developing Option III's presentation, you should be writing at least three questions to ask each of the other two groups. Your questions should be drawn from the *Arguments Against* section of Options I and II in Chapter 4. In preparing your questions, you should expect help from your group's experts on U.S. relations with the Caribbean and Central America and national security.

3. *Expert on National Security:* As an expert on this subject, you understand that the Caribbean and Central America do not pose a major threat to our national security. With the Soviet Union in crisis, we have no reason to worry about outside forces interfering in the region. At the same time, Cuba is struggling with its own problems. You recognize that the best policy for the United States is to encourage the peoples of the Caribbean and Central America to find the road to peace and stability. You should carefully review *In the Shadow of the Cold War* to develop arguments supporting Option III's plan to reduce the U.S. role in the Caribbean and Central America.

4. *Expert on U.S. Relations with the Caribbean and Central America:* As an expert on this subject, you recognize that U.S. involvement in the Caribbean and Central America has done little to help the people of the region and promote our country's interests. You realize that the policies of the United States have largely been a failure, in some cases doing more harm than good. You should carefully review *In the Shadow of the Cold War* to develop arguments in favor of Option III's proposal to give the people of the Caribbean and Central America a chance to set the course for their own future.

The Presentation: Your spokesperson will first present the case for Option III to the State Department representatives. The presentation should stress the strongest points of your case. Your spokesperson can make use of notes during the presentation but should try to speak clearly and convincingly. After all three of the option groups have completed their presentations, your cross-examiner will have an opportunity to challenge the positions of Options I and II. The goal of the cross-examiner is to point out weaknesses in the arguments of the other groups. Options I and II, as well as the State Department representatives, will also have a chance to cross-examine your group. Any member of your group may respond to these questions.

State Department Representatives

Introduction: The world has changed a great deal in the last few years. As a result, the United States has changed its policies toward many foreign countries. Our relations with the countries of the Caribbean and Central America are also being re-evaluated. In the course of this activity, you will hear about three possible options for U.S. policy in the Caribbean and Central America.

Your Role: You are a representative of the U.S. Department of State, the governmental body that conducts foreign policy for our country. Your area of responsibility is the Caribbean and Central America. Your overall goal is to promote the interests of the United States in the region. In this activity, you will hear three different views on how the United States can best accomplish your goal.

You should prepare yourself by reviewing *In the Shadow of the Cold War.*

Your Assignment: You must decide which of the three option best serves the interests of U.S. foreign policy in the Caribbean and Central America. Your decision should be based on what you hear from the option groups themselves. At the end of the discussion, ask yourself which arguments were most persuasive, and which group made the best use of historical evidence.

While the option groups are organizing their presentations, you should be preparing questions about the options. After the option groups give their presentations, you will have an opportunity to ask questions during a cross-examination period. You should prepare two questions for each of the options. Your questions should be challenging and critical. For example, a good question for Option I might be:

With the Cold War over, why is Cuba a threat to our country's interests?

Examine the *Arguments Against* section under each of the three options in Chapter 4 for ideas in developing questions. You should also review the earlier chapters of *In the Shadow of the Cold War* for historical evidence. You may work on your questions with another State Department representative. Your teacher will collect them at the end of the exercise.

After the presentations and cross-examination questions are completed, you will have a few minutes to talk with other State Department representatives before reaching your decision. Keep in mind that your judgment should be based on the presentations of the option groups. You should complete the State Department Representative Evaluation Form and turn it in to your teacher end of the exercise.

Name:_____

State Department Representative
Evaluation Form

I. Summarize the main arguments of each group on the following subjects:

Option I

U.S. national security interests:

U.S. relations with the Caribbean and Central America:

Option II

U.S. national security interests:

U.S. relations with the Caribbean and Central America:

Option III

U.S. national security interests:

U.S. relations with the Caribbean and Central America:

II. Which group presented its option most persuasively? Explain your answer.

Applying the Three Options

Overview: In this lesson, students will examine the actions, arguments, and world views associated with each of the three options on U.S. policy in the Caribbean and Central America presented in Chapter 4. By applying the perspective of each option to hypothetical events, students will analyze the international implications and historical interpretations underlying the three options. This exercise may be used either as a follow-up to Lesson 7 or as a separate activity. The lesson can be conducted as either an individual exercise or as a small group activity.

Time: One 45-minute class period

Reading Assignment/Homework: The night before the lesson, students should read Chapter 4. Note that Chapter 4 presents three different options regarding the future direction of U.S. policy in the Caribbean and Central America. Each of the options includes not only a list of proposed actions and supporting arguments, but also embodies a broader view of America's role in world affairs. Explain that the activity will require students to respond to hypothetical events from the perspective of each of the options.

Procedure:

1. Before the lesson begins, inform students that you will read a list of six hypothetical events set in the Caribbean and Central America. For each event, students will be asked to respond in writing from the perspective of a designated option. Student responses should include an explanation of a U.S. action appropriate to the designated option and a brief argument supporting the proposed action. Below is a sample response to the first hypothetical event:

> *The United States should declare its support for the democratic forces and find a way to supply them with weapons. The United States has waited more than three decades to bring down the communist regime in Cuba. The Cuban government is already in trouble. Military aid to the democratic forces would most likely ensure the success of the rebellion.*

Encourage students to make use of historical lessons to develop their arguments. (In advanced classes, students should not be allowed to refer to their textbook and notes.)

2. After reading the six statements and collecting responses from the students, review each of the statements with the entire class. Compare differences in proposed actions. Ask students to articulate their understanding of the world views for each of the three options. Discuss historical events that students made use of in their arguments. Consider the implications of applying different options to the hypothetical events.

Alternative Approach: Have students respond to each of the hypothetical events from the perspectives of all three options.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Hypothetical Events in U.S.-Cuban Relations

1. Fidel Castro has died of a heart attack. The Cuban government has declared martial law. The situation in Havana is calm, but in the eastern part of the island a group of army officers has seized a military base. The officers claim to represent democratic forces in Cuba and have appealed to the United States for help. The Cuban government has warned the United States not to interfere in this situation. **(Option I)**

2. Army officers loyal to the former Sandinista government have staged a coup in Nicaragua. The rebels have captured President Violeta Chamorro and most of her top supporters, and have control of the capital, Managua. Heavy fighting, however, is reported in the towns of southern Nicaragua and along the Atlantic coast. Fidel Castro has announced that Cuba will send 1000 troops to support the Sandinistas. **(Option III)**

3. Anti-American revolutionaries have come to power in El Salvador after having driven the U.S-supported government out of the capital. Their program calls for the creation of a socialist economy and the postponement of elections for ten years. The new government also proclaims its hope of spreading the socialist revolution to countries throughout the Caribbean and Central America. **(Option II)**

4. After launching a crash program of free-market reform, Guatemala announces that the government cannot meet its interest payments on loans to U.S. banks. The government claims that drought has severely damaged its export crops while a hurricane has destroyed a new textile factory. Critics of the government, however, blame the financial problems on official corruption. Meanwhile, anti-American guerrillas have stepped up their campaign to overthrow the government. **(Option II)**

5. The United Nations has announced that as a result of bad weather and a cut-off of Soviet assistance, Cubans will soon face famine without international aid. Fidel Castro has begun to negotiate with some European countries for aid, although he insists that foreigners will not be permitted to play a role in the distribution of relief supplies. **(Option I)**

6. The newly formed Coalition of Caribbean and Central American Nations, consisting of all the countries of the region, has announced a cooperative effort to put an end to guerrilla movements throughout the Caribbean and Central America. To carry out the program, the Coalition is requesting that the United States double its military aid to the region over the next five years. **(Option III)**

Supplementary Notes

Chapter 2

Addendum

A flurry of new information about the Cuban missile crisis was released in January 1992 suggesting that the conflict was more perilous than previously assumed. Most revealing was the newly declassified correspondence of John F. Kennedy, Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro, as well as the admission by a former Soviet general that tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba were fully equipped for launch during the missile crisis.

The emergence of new historical facts centered around a meeting of top U.S., Russian, and Cuban officials in Havana, January 8-12, 1992. The international symposium on the missile crisis was the fifth in a series of gatherings organized by the Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University. Because the conference was the first to be hosted by Havana officials, the role of Cuba in the missile crisis received special attention. The conference also provided Castro a forum to voice Cuban concerns in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

At the Havana conference, the most significant revelation about the missile crisis came from Russian General Anatoly Gribkov, the former chief of staff of the Joint Command of the Warsaw Pact and the chief of operations for Soviet forces in Cuba during the missile crisis. Gribkov said that Soviet forces in Cuba possessed nine operational tactical nuclear missiles and six launchers in October 1962. Soviet sources had not previously acknowledged the presence of nuclear warheads on the island. Although the range of the tactical missiles was limited to thirty miles, they could have been used to annihilate a U.S. force invading Cuba. Gribkov said that Soviet commanders in Cuba were authorized to launch the tactical missiles under certain conditions. Gribkov also said that nuclear warheads for intermediate-range missiles were also present on the island. Although these missiles were not fully operational at the time the missile crisis was defused, Soviet forces could have prepared them for launch in a matter of days.

In addition to Gribkov's statements, Cuba and the United States released a number of important documents around the time of the conference. Among the three documents released by Cuban sources was a letter from Khrushchev to Castro dated October 22, 1962. (For the complete text, see page thirty-four of the Supplementary Notes.) At the Havana conference, Castro said that he had interpreted the letter to mean that the Soviets would vigorously defend Cuban interests.

The most significant information to be found in the eleven letters declassified by the U.S. Department of State concerns Kennedy's supposed pledge not to invade Cuba. Contrary to the assumption of many scholars, the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence of December 10 and December 14, 1962, indicates that the U.S. president rebuffed Khrushchev's request that the United States provide formal assurances that it would not invade the island. (For excerpts of the exchange, see page forty-eight of the Supplementary Notes.)

Documents of the Cuban Missile Crisis

Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to Prime Minister Castro, October 22, 1962

Dear Comrade Castro:

The Soviet Government has just received from the President of the U.S. the following document [referring to Kennedy's October 22, 1962, speech; see page ten of Lesson 4]. We send you a copy.

We consider this declaration of the government of the United States and Kennedy's speech of October 22 to be an exceptional intervention in the affairs of the Republic of Cuba, a violation of the norms of international law and of the fundamental rules that govern relations between states and a blatant act of provocation against the Soviet Union. The Republic of Cuba has the same rights as any other sovereign state to defend its country and to choose its allies according to its wishes. We reject the Northamerican government's shameless demands to control the shipment of weapons to Cuba and its aspirations to determine the type of weapons that the Republic of Cuba may possess. The U.S. government knows perfectly well that no sovereign state would allow interference in its relations with other states and that it would not present accounts on measures taken to strengthen the defense of its country.

Responding to Kennedy's speech, the Soviet Government has issued a statement in which it expresses the most determined protest against the piratical actions of the Northamerican government and qualifies these actions as perfidious and aggressive against sovereign states, stating its decision to fight actively against such actions.

We have instructed our representative on the Security Council to present urgently the question of violation, by the U.S., of the norms of international law and the Charter of the United Nations Organization and to emit a determined protest against the aggressive and perfidious actions of Northamerican imperialism.

Because of the situation that has arisen we have instructed the Soviet military representatives stationed in Cuba on the need to take the necessary measures and to be at full readiness.

We are sure that the actions undertaken by the Northamerican imperialists in trying to take away the legitimate right of the Republic of Cuba to strengthen its defensive capacity and to defend the motherland will provoke the angry protest of all peace-loving peoples and will provoke the mobilization of great masses to defend the just cause of Revolutionary Cuba.

We send you, comrade Castro, and all your comrades in arms, our warm greetings and express our firm certainty that the aggressive plans of Northamerican imperialism will suffer defeat.

N. Khrushchev

U.S. Proclamation on Interdiction of Offensive Weapons, October 23, 1962

WHEREAS the peace of the world and the security of the United States and of all American States are endangered by reason of the establishment by the Sino-Soviet powers of an offensive military capability in Cuba, including bases for ballistic missiles with a potential range covering most of North and South America:

WHEREAS by a Joint Resolution passed by the Congress of the United States and approved on October 3, 1962, it was declared that the United States is determined to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere, and to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States; and

WHEREAS the Organ of Consultation of the American Republics meeting in Washington on October 23, 1962, recommended that the Member States, in accordance with Articles six and eight of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States in accordance with the aforementioned resolutions of the United States Congress and of the Organ of Consultation of the American Republics, and to defend the security of the United States, do hereby proclaim that the forces under my command are ordered, beginning at 2:00 P.M. Greenwich time October 24, 1962, to interdict, subject to the instructions herein contained, the delivery of offensive weapons and associated material to Cuba.

For the purposes of this Proclamation the following are declared to be prohibited material:

Surface-to-surface missiles; bomber aircraft; bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for any of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment to support or operate the above items; and any other classes of material hereafter designated by the Secretary of Defense for the purpose of effectuating this Proclamation.

To enforce this order, the Secretary of Defense shall take appropriate measures to prevent the delivery of prohibited material to Cuba, employing the land, sea, and air forces of the United States in operation with any forces that may be made available by other American States.

The Secretary of Defense may make such regulations and issue such directives as he deems necessary to ensure the effectiveness of this order, including the designation, within a reasonable distance of Cuba, of prohibited or restricted zones and or prescribed routes.

Any vessel or craft which may be proceeding toward Cuba may be intercepted and may be directed to identify itself, its cargo, equipment and stores and its ports of call, to stop, to lie to, to submit to visit and search, or to proceed as directed. Any vessel or craft which fails or refuses to respond to or comply with directions shall be subject to being taken into custody. Any vessel or craft which it is believed is en route to Cuba and may be carrying prohibited material or may itself constitute such material shall, wherever possible, be directed to proceed to another destination of its own choice and shall be taken into custody if it fails or refuses to obey

such directions. All vessels or craft taken into custody shall be sent into a port of the United States for appropriate disposition.

In carrying out this order, force shall not be used except in case of failure or refusal to comply with directions, or with regulations or directives of the Secretary of Defense issued hereunder, after reasonable efforts have been made to communicate them to the vessel or craft, or in case of self-defense. In any case, force shall be used only to the extent necessary.

Supplementary Notes

Letter from Prime Minister Castro to Chairman Khrushchev, October 26, 1962

Dear Comrade Khrushchev:

Given the analysis of the situation and the reports which have reached us, [I] consider an attack to be almost imminent--within the next 24 to 72 hours. There are two possible variants: the first and most probable one is an air attack against certain objectives with the limited aim of destroying them; the second, and though less probable, still possible, is a full invasion. This would require a large force and is the most repugnant form of aggression, which might restrain them.

You can be sure that we will resist with determination, whatever the case. The Cuban people's morale is extremely high and the people will confront aggression heroically.

I would like to briefly express my own personal opinion.

If the second variant takes place and the imperialists invade Cuba with the aim of occupying it, the dangers of their aggressive policy are so great that after such an invasion the Soviet Union must never allow circumstances in which the imperialists could carry out a nuclear first strike against it.

I tell you this because I believe that the imperialists' aggressiveness makes them extremely dangerous, and that if they manage to carry out an invasion of Cuba--a brutal act in violation of universal and moral law--then that would be the moment to eliminate this danger forever, in an act of the most legitimate self-defense. However harsh and terrible the solution, there would be no other.

This opinion is shaped by observing the development of their aggressive policy. The imperialists, without regard for world opinion and against laws and principles, have blockaded the seas, violated our air-space, and are preparing to invade, while at the same time blocking any possibility of negotiation, even though they understand the gravity of the problem.

You have been, and are, a tireless defender of peace, and I understand that these moments, when the results of your superhuman efforts are so seriously threatened, must be bitter for you. We will maintain our hopes for saving the peace until the last moment, and we are ready to contribute to this in any way we can. But, at the same time, we are serene and ready to confront a situation which we see as very real and imminent.

I convey to you the infinite gratitude and recognition of the Cuban people to the Soviet people, who have been so generous and fraternal, along with our profound gratitude and admiration to you personally. We wish you success with the enormous task and great responsibilities which are in your hands.

Fraternally,

Fidel Castro

Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 26, 1962

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of October 25. From your letter I got the feeling that you have some understanding of the situation which has developed, and (some) sense of responsibility. I value this.

Now we have already publicly exchanged our evaluations of the events around Cuba and each of us has set forth his explanation and his understanding of these events. Consequently, I would judge that, apparently, a continuation of an exchange of opinions at such a distance, even in the form of secret letters, will hardly add anything to that which one side has already said to the other.

I think you will understand me correctly if you are really concerned about the welfare of the world. Everyone needs peace: both capitalists, if they have not lost their reason, and, still more, communists, people who know how to value not only their own lives but, more than anything, the lives of the peoples. We, communists, are against all wars between states in general and have been defending the cause of peace since we came into the world. We have always regarded war as a calamity, and not as a game nor as a means of the attainment of definite goals, nor, all the more, as a goal in itself. Our goals are clear, and the means to attain them is labor. War is our enemy and calamity for all the peoples.

It is thus that we, Soviet people, and, together with us, other peoples as well, understand the questions of war and peace. I can, in any case, firmly say this for the peoples of the socialist countries, as well as for all progressive people who want peace, happiness, and friendship among peoples.

I see, Mr. President, that you too are not devoid of a sense of anxiety for the fate of the world, of understanding, and of what war entails. What would a war give you? You are threatening us with war. But you well know that the very least which you would receive in reply would be that you would experience the same consequences as those which you sent us. And that must be clear to us, people invested with authority, trust, and responsibility. We must not succumb to intoxication and petty passions, regardless of whether elections are impending in this or that country, or not impending. These are all transient things, but if indeed war should break out, then it would not be in our power to stop it, for such is the logic of war. I have participated in two wars and know that war ends when it has rolled through cities and villages, everywhere sowing death and destruction.

In the name of the Soviet Government and the Soviet people, I assure you that your conclusions regarding offensive weapons on Cuba are groundless. It is apparent from what you have written me that our conceptions are different on this score, or rather, we have different estimates of these or those military means. Indeed, in reality, the same forms of weapons can have different interpretations.

You are a military man and, I hope, will understand me. Let us take for example a simple cannon. What sort of means is this: offensive or defensive? A cannon is a defensive means if it is set up to defend boundaries or a fortified area. But if one concentrates artillery, and adds to it the necessary number of troops, then the same cannons do become an offensive means, because they prepare and clear the war for infantry to attack. The same happens with missile-nuclear weapons as well, with any type of this weapon.

You are mistaken if you think that any of our means on Cuba are offensive. However, let us not quarrel now. It is apparent that I will not be able to convince you of this. But I say to you: you, Mr. President, are a military man and should understand: one can attack, if one has on one's territory even an enormous quantity of missiles of various effective radiuses and various power, but using only these means. These missiles are a means of extermination and destruction. But one cannot attack with these missiles, even nuclear missiles of a power of 100 megatons because only people, troops, can attack. Without people, any means however powerful cannot be offensive.

How can one, consequently, give such a completely incorrect interpretation as you are now giving, to the effect that some sort of means on Cuba are offensive. All the means located there, and I assure you of this, have a defensive character, are on Cuba solely for the purposes of defense, and we have sent them to

Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government. You, however, say that these are offensive means.

But, Mr. President, do you really seriously think that Cuba can attack the United States and that even we together with Cuba can attack you for the territory of Cuba? Can you really think that way? How is it possible? We do not understand this. Has something so new appeared in military strategy that one can think that it is possible to attack thus, I say precisely attack, and not destroy, since barbarians, people who have lost their sense, destroy.

I believe that you have no basis to think this way. You can regard us with distrust, but, in any case, you can be calm in this regard, that we are of sound mind and understand perfectly well that if we attack you, you will respond the same way. But you too will receive the same that you hurl against us. And I think that you also understand this. My conversation with you in Vienna gives me the right to talk to you this way.

This indicates that we are normal people, that we correctly understand and correctly evaluate the situation. Consequently, how can we permit the incorrect actions which you ascribe to us? Only lunatics or suicides, who themselves want to perish and to destroy the whole world before they die, could do this. We, however, want to live and do not at all want to destroy your country. We want something quite different: to compete with your country on a peaceful basis. We quarrel with you, we have differences on ideological questions. But our view of the world consists in this, that ideological questions, as well as economic problems, should be solved not by military means, they must be solved on the basis of peaceful competition, i.e., as this is understood in capitalist society, on the basis of competition. We have proceeded and are proceeding from the fact that the peaceful coexistence of the two different social-political systems, now existing in the world, is necessary, that it is necessary to assure a stable peace. That is the sort of principle we hold.

You have now proclaimed piratical measures, which were employed in the Middle Ages, when ships proceeding in international waters were attacked, and you have called this "a quarantine" around Cuba. Our vessels, apparently, will soon enter the zone which your Navy is patrolling. I assure you that these vessels, now bound for Cuba, are carrying the most innocent peaceful cargoes. Do you really think that we only occupy ourselves with the carriage of so-called offensive weapons, atomic and hydrogen bombs? Although perhaps your military people imagine that these (cargoes) are some sort of special type of weapon, I assure you that they are the most ordinary peaceful products.

Consequently, Mr. President, let us show good sense. I assure you that on those ships, which are bound for Cuba, there are no weapons at all. The weapons which were necessary for the defense of Cuba are already there. I do not want to say that there were not any shipments of weapons at all. No, there were such shipments. But now Cuba has already received the necessary means of defense.

I don't know whether you can understand me and believe me. But I should like to have you believe in yourself and to agree that one cannot give way to passions; it is necessary to control them. And in what direction are events now developing? If you stop the vessels, then, as you yourself know, that would be piracy. If we started to do that with regard to your ships, then you would also be as indignant as we and the whole world now are. One cannot give another interpretation to such actions, because one cannot legalize lawlessness. If this were permitted, then there would be no peace, there would also be no peaceful coexistence. We should then be forced to put into effect the necessary measures of a defensive character to protect our interests in accordance with international law. Why should this be done? To what would all this lead?

Let us normalize relations. We have received an appeal from the Acting Secretary General of the UN, U Thant, with his proposals. I have already answered him. His proposals come to this, that our side should not transport armaments of any kind to Cuba during a certain period of time, while negotiations are being conducted--and we are ready to enter such negotiations--and the other side should not undertake any sort of piratical actions against vessels engaged in navigation on the high seas. I consider these proposals reasonable. This would be a way out of the situation which has been created, which would give the peoples the possibility of breathing calmly. You have asked what happened, what evoked the delivery of weapons to Cuba? You have spoken about this to our Minister of Foreign Affairs. I will tell you frankly, Mr. President, what evoked it.

We were very grieved by the fact--I spoke about it in Vienna--that a landing took place, that an attack on Cuba was committed, as a result of which many Cubans perished. You yourself told me then that this had been a mistake. I respected that explanation. You repeated it to me several times, pointing out that not everybody occupying a high position would acknowledge his mistakes as you had done. I value such frankness. For my part, I told you that we too possess no less courage; we also acknowledged those mistakes which had been committed during the history of our state, and not only acknowledged, but sharply condemned them.

If you are really concerned about the peace and welfare of your people, and this is your responsibility as President, then I, as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, am concerned for my people. Moreover, the preservation of world peace should be our joint concern, since if, under contemporary conditions, war should break out, it would be a war not only between the reciprocal claims, but a worldwide cruel and destructive war.

Why have we proceeded to assist Cuba with military and economic aid? The answer is: we have proceeded to do so only for reasons of humanitarianism. At one time, our people itself had a revolution, when Russia was still a backward country. We were attacked then. We were the target of attack by many countries. The USA participated in that adventure. This has been recorded by participants against our country. A whole book has been written about this by General [William Sidney] Graves, who, at that time, commanded the US expeditionary corps. Graves called it "The American Adventure in Siberia."

We know how difficult it is to accomplish a revolution and how difficult it is to reconstruct a country on new foundations. We sincerely sympathize with Cuba and the Cuban people, but we are not interfering in questions of domestic structure, we are not interfering in their affairs. The Soviet Union desires to help the Cubans build their life as they themselves wish and that others should not hinder them.

You once said that the United States was not preparing an invasion. But you also declared that you sympathized with the Cuban counterrevolutionary emigrants, that you support them and would help them to realize their plans against the present government of Cuba. It is also not a secret to anyone that the threat of armed attack, aggression, has constantly hung, and continues to hang over Cuba. It was only this which impelled us to respond to the request of the Cuban government to furnish it aid for the strengthening of the defensive capacity of this country.

If assurances were given by the President and government of the United States that the USA itself would not participate in an attack on Cuba and would restrain others from actions of this sort, if you would recall you fleet, this would immediately change everything. I am not speaking for Fidel Castro, but I think that he and the government of Cuba, evidently, would declare demobilization and would appeal to the people to get down to peaceful labor. Then, too, the question of armaments would disappear, since, if there is no threat, then armaments are a burden for every people. Then, too, the question of the destruction, not only of the armaments which you call offensive, but of all other armaments as well, would look different.

I spoke in the name of the Soviet government in the United Nations and introduced a proposal for the disbandment of all armies and for the destruction of all armaments. How then can I now count on those armaments?

Armaments bring only disasters. When one accumulates them, this damages the economy, and if one put them to use, then they destroy people on both sides. Consequently, only a madman can believe that armaments are the principal means in the life of society. No, they are an enforced loss of human energy, and what is more are for the destruction of man himself. If people do not show wisdom, then in the final analysis they will come to a clash, like blind moles, and then reciprocal extermination will begin.

Let us therefore show statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for Cuba, will not carry any kind of armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear.

Supplementary Notes

Mr. President, I appeal to you to weigh well what the aggressive, piratical actions, which you have declared the USA intends to carry out in international waters, would lead to. You yourself know that any sensible man simply cannot agree with this, cannot recognize your right to such actions.

If you did this, as the first step towards the unleashing of war, well then, it is evident that nothing else is left to us but to accept this challenge of yours. If, however, you have not lost your self-control and sensibly conceive what this might lead to, then, Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot. And what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.

Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.

We welcome all forces which stand on positions of peace. Consequently, I expressed gratitude to Mr. Bertrand Russell, too, who manifests alarm and concern for the fate of the world, and I readily responded to the appeal of the Acting Secretary General of the UN, U Thant.

There, Mr. President, are my thoughts, which, if you agreed with them, could put an end to that tense situation which is disturbing all peoples.

These thoughts are dictated by a sincere desire to relieve the situation, to remove the threat of war.

Respectfully yours,

Nikita Khrushchev

Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 27, 1962

Dear Mr. President:

It is with great satisfaction that I studied your reply to Mr. U Thant on the adoption of measures in order to avoid contact by our ships and thus avoid irreparable fatal consequences. This reasonable step on your part persuades me that you are showing solicitude for the preservation of peace, and I note this with satisfaction.

I have already said that the only concern of our people and government and myself personally as chairman of the Council of Ministers is to develop our country and have it hold a worthy place among people of the world in economic competition, advance of culture and arts, and the rise in people's living standards. This is the loftiest and most necessary field for competition which will only benefit both the winner and loser, because this benefit is peace and an increase in the facilities by means of which man lives and obtains pleasure.

In your statement, you said that the main aim lies not only in reaching agreement and adopting measures to avert contact of our ships, and, consequently, a deepening of the crisis, which because of this contact can spark off the fire of military conflict after which any talks would be superfluous because other forces and other laws would begin to operate--the laws of war. I agree with you that this is only a first step. The main thing is to normalize and stabilize the situation in the world between states and between people.

I understand your concern for the security of the United States, Mr. President, because this is the first duty of the president. However, these questions are also uppermost in our minds. The same duties rest

with me as chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. You have been worried over our assisting Cuba with arms designed to strengthen its defensive potential--precisely defensive potential--because Cuba, no matter what weapons it had, could not compare with you since these are different dimensions, the more so given up-to-date means of extermination.

Our purpose has been and is to help Cuba, and no one can challenge the humanity of our motives aimed at allowing Cuba to live peacefully and develop as its people desire. You want to relieve your country from danger and this is understandable. However, Cuba also wants this. All countries want to relieve themselves from danger. But how can we, the Soviet Union and our government, assess your actions which, in effect, mean that you have surrounded the Soviet Union with military bases, surrounded our allies with military bases, set up military bases literally around our country, and stationed your rocket weapons at them? This is no secret. High-placed American officials demonstratively declare this. Your rockets are stationed in Britain and in Italy and pointed at us. Your rockets are stationed in Turkey.

You are worried over Cuba. You say that it worries you because it lies at a distance of ninety miles across the sea from the shores of the United States. However, Turkey lies next to us. Our sentinels are pacing up and down and watching each other. Do you believe that you have the right to demand security for your country and the removal of such weapons that your qualify as offensive, while not recognizing this right for us?

You have stationed devastating rocket weapons, which you call offensive, in Turkey literally right next to us. How then does recognition of our equal military possibilities tally with such unequal relations between our great states? This does not tally at all.

It is good, Mr. President, that you agreed for our representatives to meet and begin talks, apparently with the participation of U.N. Acting Secretary General U Thant. Consequently, to some extent, he assumes the role of intermediary, and we believe that he can cope with the responsible mission if, of course, every side that is drawn into this conflict shows good will.

I think that one could rapidly eliminate the conflict and normalize the situation. Then people would heave a sigh of relief, considering that the statesmen who bear the responsibility have sober minds, an awareness of their responsibility, and an ability to solve complicated problems and not allow matters to slide to the disaster of war.

This is why I make this proposal: We agree to remove those weapons from Cuba which you regard as offensive weapons. We agree to do this and to state this commitment in the United Nations. Your representatives will make a statement to the effect that the United States, on its part, bearing in mind the anxiety and concern of the Soviet state, will evacuate its analogous weapons from Turkey. Let us reach an understanding on what time you and we need to put this into effect.

After this, representatives of the U.N. Security Council could control on-the-spot the fulfillment of these commitments. Of course, it is necessary that the Governments of Cuba and Turkey would allow these representatives to come to their countries and check fulfillment of this commitment, which each side undertakes. Apparently, it would be better if these representatives enjoyed the trust of the Security Council and ours--the United States and the Soviet Union--as well as of Turkey and Cuba. I think that it will not be difficult to find such people who enjoy the trust and respect of all interested sides.

We, having assumed this commitment in order to give satisfaction and hope to the peoples of Cuba and Turkey and to increase their confidence in their security, will make a statement in the Security Council to the effect that the Soviet Government gives a solemn pledge to respect the integrity of the frontiers and the sovereignty of Turkey, not to intervene in its domestic affairs, not to invade Turkey, not to make available its territory as a *place d'armes* for such invasion, and also will restrain those who would think of launching an aggression against Turkey either from Soviet territory or from the territory of other states bordering on Turkey.

The U.S. Government will make the same statement in the Security Council with regard to Cuba. It will

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

declare that the United States will respect the integrity of the frontiers of Cuba, its sovereignty, undertakes not to intervene in its domestic affairs, not to invade and not to make its territory available as [a] *place d'armes* for the invasion of Cuba, and also will restrain those who would think of launching an aggression against Cuba either from U.S. territory or from the territory of other states bordering on Cuba.

Of course, for this we would have to reach agreement with you and to arrange for some deadline. Let us agree to give some time, but not to delay, two or three weeks, not more than a month.

The weapons on Cuba, that you have mentioned and which, as you say, alarm you, are in the hands of Soviet officers. Therefore any accidental use of them whatsoever to the detriment of the United States of America is excluded. These means are stationed in Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government and only in defensive aims. Therefore, if there is no invasion of Cuba, or an attack on the Soviet Union, or other of our allies then, of course, these means do not threaten anyone and will not threaten. For they do not pursue offensive aims.

If you accept my proposal, Mr. President, we would send our representatives to New York, to the United Nations, and would give them exhaustive instructions to order to come to terms sooner. If you would also appoint your men and give them appropriate instructions, this problem could be solved soon.

Why would I like to achieve this? Because the entire world is now agitated and expects reasonable actions from us. The greatest pleasure for all the people would be an announcement on our agreement, on nipping in the bud the conflict that has arisen. I attach a great importance to such understanding because it might be a good beginning and, specifically, facilitate a nuclear test ban agreement. The problem of tests could be solved simultaneously, not linking one with the other, because they are different problems. However, it is important to reach an understanding to both these problems in order to make a good gift to the people, to let them rejoice in the news that a nuclear test ban agreement has also been reached and thus there will be no further contamination of the atmosphere. Your and our positions on this issue are very close.

All this, possibly, would serve as a good impetus to searching for mutually acceptable agreements on other disputed issues, too, on which there is an exchange of opinion between us. These problems have not yet been solved, but they wait for an urgent solution which would clear the international atmosphere. We are ready for this.

These are my proposals, Mr. President.

Respectfully yours,

Nikita Khrushchev

Letter from President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev, October 27, 1962

I have read your letter of October 26th, with great care and welcomed the statement of your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under effective United Nations arrangements.

Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my representatives in New York instructions that will permit them to work out this weekend--in cooperation with the Acting Secretary General and your representative--an arrangement for a permanent solution to the Cuban problem along the lines suggested in your letter of October 26th. As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals--which seem generally acceptable as I understand them--are as follows:

1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

2) We, on our part, would agree--upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments--(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

If you will give your representative similar instructions, there is no reason why we should not be able to complete these arrangements and announce them to the world within a couple of days. The effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding "other armaments," as proposed in your second letter which you made public. I would like to say again that the United States is very much interested in reducing tensions and halting the arms race; and if your letter signifies that you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to consider with our allies any useful proposals.

But the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the cessation of work on missile sites in Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable, under effective international guarantees. The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion concerning Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world security, would surely lead to an intensified situation on the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world. For this reason I hope we can quickly agree along the lines outlined in this letter and in your letter of October 26th

John F. Kennedy

Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 28, 1962

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your message of 27 October. I express my satisfaction and thank you for the sense of proportion you have displayed and for realization of the responsibility which now devolves on you for the preservation of the peace of the world.

I regard with great understanding your concern and the concern of the United States people in connection with the fact that the weapons you describe as offensive are formidable weapons indeed. Both you and we understand what kind of weapons these are.

In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible the conflict which endangers the cause of peace, to give an assurance to all people who crave peace, and to reassure the American people, all of whom, I am certain, also want peace, as do the people of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, in addition to earlier

instructions on the discontinuation of further work on weapons constructions sites, has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, I should like to repeat what I had already written to you in my earlier messages--that the Soviet Government has given economic assistance to the Republic of Cuba, as well as arms, because Cuba and the Cuban people were constantly under the continuous threat of an invasion of Cuba.

A piratic vessel had shelled Havana. They say that this shelling was done by irresponsible Cuban emigres. Perhaps so. However, the question is from where did they shoot. It is a fact that these Cubans have no territory, they are fugitives from their country, and they have no means to conduct military operations.

This means that someone put into their hands these weapons for shelling Havana and for piracy in the Caribbean in Cuban territorial waters. It is impossible in our time not to notice a piratic ship, considering the concentration in the Caribbean of American ships from which everything can be seen and observed.

In these conditions, pirate ships freely roam around and shell Cuba and make piratic attacks on peaceful cargo ships. It is known that they even shelled a British cargo ship. In a word, Cuba was under the continuous threat of aggressive forces, which did not conceal their intention to invade its territory.

The Cuban people want to build their life in their own interests without external interference. This is their right, and they cannot be blamed for wanting to be masters of their own country and disposing of the fruits of their own labor. The threat of invasion of Cuba and all other schemes for creating tension over China are designed to strike the Cuban people with a sense of insecurity, intimidate them, and prevent them from peacefully building their new life.

Mr. President, I should like to say clearly once more that we could not remain indifferent to this. The Soviet Government decided to render assistance to Cuba with means of defense against aggression--only with means for defense purposes. We have supplied the defense means which you describe as offensive means. We have supplied them to prevent an attack on Cuba--to prevent rash acts.

I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of 27 October 1962 that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappear.

It is for this reason that we instructed our officers--these means as I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet officers--to take appropriate measures to discontinue construction of aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to return them to the Soviet Union. As I had informed you in the letter of 27 October, we are prepared to reach agreement to enable U.N. representatives to verify the dismantling of these means. Thus in view of the assurances you have given and our instructions on dismantling, there is every condition for eliminating the present conflict....

Respectfully yours,

N. Khrushchev

Letter from Prime Minister Castro to Acting Secretary General U Thant, October 28, 1962

U Thant
Acting Secretary General of the United Nations

With reference to the statement made by Mr. John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, in a letter addressed to Mr. Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., to the effect

that the United States would agree, after suitable arrangements had been made through the United Nations, to remove the blockade now in effect and to give guarantees against an invasion of Cuba, and with reference to the decision, announced by Mr. Nikita Khrushchev, to withdraw strategic defence weapons facilities from Cuban territory, the Revolutionary Government of Cuba wishes to make the following statement:

The guarantees mentioned by President Kennedy that there will be no aggression against Cuba will be ineffective unless, in addition to the removal of the naval blockade which he promises, the following measures, *inter alia*, are adopted:

1. Cessation of the economic blockade and of all the measures of commercial and economic pressure being carried out by the United States against our country throughout the world.

2. Cessation of all subversive activities, of the dropping and landing of weapons and explosives by air and sea, of the organization of invasions by mercenaries, and of the infiltration of spies and saboteurs--all of which activities are being carried on from the territory of the United States and certain accomplice countries.

3. Cessation of the piratical attacks being carried out from bases in the United States and Puerto Rico.

4. Cessation of all violations of our air space and territorial waters by United States aircraft and warships.

5. Withdrawal of the naval base of Guantanamo and return of the Cuban territory occupied by the United States.

Accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Major Fidel Castro Ruz
Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba

Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to Prime Minister Castro, October 30, 1962

Dear Comrade Fidel Castro:

....We understand that for you certain difficulties may have emerged as a consequence of the promises we made to the United States to withdraw the missile bases from Cuba in exchange for their promise to abandon their plans to invade Cuba and to prevent their allies in the Western Hemisphere from doing so, to end their so-called "quarantine"--their blockade of Cuba. This commitment has led to an end to the conflict in the Caribbean, a conflict which implied, as you can well understand, a superpower confrontation and its transformation into a world war where the missiles and thermonuclear weapons would have been used. According to our ambassador, certain Cubans feel that the Cuban people would prefer a different kind of statement, one that would not deal with the withdrawal of the missiles. It is possible that such feelings exist among the people. But we, politicians and heads of state, are the people's leaders and the people do not know everything. This is why we must march as the head of the people. Then they will follow and respect us.

If, by giving in to popular sentiment, we had allowed ourselves to be swept up by the more inflamed sectors of the populace, and if we had refused to reach a reasonable agreement with the government of the USA, war would have probably broken out, resulting in millions of deaths. Those who survived would have blamed the leaders for not having taken the measures that would have avoided this war of extermination.

The prevention of war and of an attack on Cuba did not depend only on the measures taken by our governments, but also on the analysis and examination of the enemy's actions near your territory. In short, the situation had to be considered as a whole.

Some people say that we did not consult sufficiently with each other before taking the decision of which you know.

In fact, we consider that consultations did take place, dear Comrade Fidel Castro, since we received your cables, one more alarming than the other, and finally your cable of October 27 where you said that you were almost certain that an attack against Cuba was imminent. According to you it was only a matter of time: 24 or 72 hours.

Having received this very alarming cable from you, and knowing of your courage, we believed the alert to be totally justified.

Wasn't that consultation on your part? We interpreted that cable as a sign of maximum alert. But if we had carried on with our consultations in such conditions, knowing that the bellicose and unbridled militarists of the United States wanted to seize the occasion to attack Cuba, we would have been wasting our time and the strike could have taken place.

We think that the presence of our strategic missiles in Cuba has polarized the attention of the imperialists. They were afraid that they would be used, which is why they risked wanting to eliminate them either by bombing them or by invading Cuba. And we must recognize that they had the capability to put them out of action. This is why, I repeat, your sense of alarm was totally justified.

In your cable of October 27 you proposed that we be the first to carry out a nuclear strike against the enemy's territory. Naturally you understand where that would lead us. It would not be a simple strike, but the start of a thermonuclear world war.

Dear Comrade Fidel Castro, I find your proposal to be wrong, even though I understand your reasons.

We have lived through a very grave moment, a global thermonuclear war could have broken out. Of course the United States would have suffered enormous losses, but the Soviet Union and the whole socialist bloc would have also suffered greatly. It is even difficult to say how things would have ended for the Cuban people. First of all, Cuba would have burned in the fires of war. Without a doubt the Cuban people would have fought courageously but, also without a doubt, the Cuban people would have perished heroically. We struggle against imperialism, not in order to die, but to draw on all of our potential, to lose as little as possible, and later to win more, so as to be a victor and make communism triumph.

The measures which we have adopted have allowed us to reach the goal which we had set when we decided to send the missiles to Cuba. We have extracted from the United States the commitment not to invade Cuba and not to allow their Latin American allies to do so. We have accomplished all of this without a nuclear war.

We believe that we must take advantage of all the possibilities to defend Cuba, to strengthen its independence and sovereignty, to thwart military aggression, and to prevent a global thermonuclear war in the present stage.

And we have succeeded.

Of course, we have made concessions, we have made certain commitments. We have acted on the principle of reciprocal concessions. The United States has also made concessions, it has committed itself publicly, before the whole world, not to attack Cuba.

Therefore, if we compare a U.S. attack and thermonuclear war on the one hand, and on the other hand the commitments made, the reciprocal concessions, the guarantee of the inviolability of the Republic of Cuba, and the prevention of a world war, then I think that the conclusion is clear....

N. Khrushchev

Letter from Prime Minister Castro to Chairman Khrushchev, October 31, 1962

Dear Comrade Khrushchev:

I received your letter of October 30. According to you, we were consulted before you took the decision to withdraw the strategic missiles. You justify this statement by referring to the alarming news coming out of Cuba and to my last cable of October 27. I do not know what information you received; I am responding only to the message I sent on the night of the 26th, and which you received on the 27th.

What we did in the face of events, Comrade Khrushchev, was to prepare ourselves and be ready to fight. In Cuba there was only one type of alert: an alert in the face of imminent combat. When, according to us, the imperialist attack was imminent, I thought it appropriate to reveal this to you and to alert both the Soviet government and the Soviet command since there were Soviet forces determined to fight with us in defending the Republic of Cuba against an external aggression, which we could not have stopped but against which we could have resisted.

I told you that the morale of our people was very high and that we would resist aggression heroically. At the end of my message I told you that we would wait for the events calmly.

Danger could not impress us because we had seen it hover over our country for a long time, in a way, we were used to it.

The Soviets who where with us know how admirable the stance of our people during the crisis has been, and of the great fraternity that has developed between men of our two peoples in these decisive hours. Many Cubans and Soviets, who were ready to die in maximum dignity, shed tears when they learned of the surprising decision, unexpected and almost unconditional, to withdraw the weapons.

You perhaps do not know of the extent to which the Cuban people were ready to fulfill their duty towards their Motherland and toward humanity.

I was not unaware, when I wrote them, that the terms I used in my letter could be misinterpreted, and that is what happened: maybe because you did not read them attentively, maybe because of the translation, maybe because I tried to say too much in too few lines. Nevertheless, I did not hesitate to do it. Do you think, Comrade Khrushchev, that we were selfishly thinking of ourselves, of our generous people who were prepared to immolate themselves, not without thought, but fully aware of the risk they were running?

No, Comrade Khrushchev, rarely in history--I can even say never--has any people run such a danger, never has a people been so ready to fight and die with such a universal sense of duty.

We knew, don't think that we didn't, that we would have been exterminated, as you insinuate in your letter, in the case of thermonuclear war. That would, nevertheless, not have prompted us to ask you to withdraw the missiles, to ask you to concede. Do you by any chance think that we wanted such a war? But how to avoid it if an invasion took place? That, precisely, was a possibility, since the imperialists were blocking every solution and their demands, in our opinion, were unacceptable to the USSR and to Cuba....

Fraternally,

Fidel Castro

Supplementary Notes

Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, December 10, 1962

Dear Mr. President,

...I will tell you frankly that we have removed our means from Cuba relying on your assurance that the United States and its allies will not invade Cuba. Those means really had the purpose of defending the sovereignty of Cuba and therefore after your assurance they lost their purpose. We hope and we would like to believe--I spoke of that publicly too, as you know--that you will adhere to the commitments which you have taken, as strictly as we do with regard to our commitments. We, Mr. President, have already fulfilled our commitments concerning the removal of our missiles and IL-28 planes from Cuba and we did it even ahead of time. It is obvious that fulfillment by you of your commitments cannot be as clearly demonstrated as it was done by us since your commitments are of a long-term nature. But it is important to fulfill them and to do everything so that no doubts are sown from the very start that they will not be fulfilled...

...We believe that the guarantees for non-invasion of Cuba given by you will be maintained and not only in the period of your stay in the White House, that, to use an expression, goes without saying. We believe that you will be able to receive a mandate at the next election too, that is that you will be the U.S. President for six years, which would appeal to us. At our times, six years in world politics is a long period of time and during that period we could create good conditions for peaceful coexistence on earth and this would be highly appreciated by the peoples of our countries as well as by all other peoples.

Therefore, Mr. President, I would like to express a wish that you follow the right way, as we do, in appraising the situation. Now it is of special importance to provide for the possibility of an exchange of opinion through confidential channels which you and I have set up and which we use. But the confidential nature of our personal relations will depend on whether you fulfill--as we did--the commitments taken by you and give instructions to your representatives in New York to formalize these commitments in appropriate documents. This is needed in order that all the peoples be sure that tension in the Caribbean is a matter of yesterday and that now normal conditions have been really created in the world. And for this it is necessary to fix the assumed commitments in the documents of both sides and register them with the United Nations...

Respectfully yours,

N. Khrushchev

Letter from President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev, December 14, 1962

Dear Mr. Chairman:

...You refer to the importance of my statements on an invasion of Cuba and of our intention to fulfill them, so that no doubts are sown from the start. I have already stated my position publicly in my press conference on November 20th, and I am glad that this statement appears to have your understanding; we have never wanted to be driven by the acts of others into war in Cuba. The other side of the coin, however, is that we do need to have adequate assurances that all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and are not reintroduced, and that Cuba itself commits no aggressive acts against any of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. As I understand you, you feel confident that Cuba will not in fact engage in such aggressive acts, and of course I already have your own assurance about the offensive weapons. So I myself should suppose that you would accept our position--but it is probably better to leave final discussion of these matters to our representatives in New York. I quite agree with you that the larger part of the crisis has now been ended and we should not permit others to stand in the way of promptly settling the rest with further acrimony...

John F. Kennedy

Distinguishing Between a Blockade and a Quarantine

The terms *blockade* and *quarantine* are often used interchangeably in reference to the U.S. Navy's efforts to stop Soviet ships from reaching Cuba during the missile crisis. President Kennedy called the Navy's action a quarantine rather than a blockade in order to avoid appearing as the aggressor in the conflict. According to the principles of international law, a blockade is considered an act of war. The term quarantine, however, had not been clearly defined.

The following two passages from *On The Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis** help clarify the distinction, in the minds of Kennedy and his top advisers, between a blockade and a quarantine. Paul H. Nitze, President Kennedy's Assistant Secretary of Defense and ExComm member, recalls that the term "quarantine" was adopted after an argument between Dean Acheson, Secretary of State under President Truman, and Leonard C. Meeker, then Deputy Legal Counsel to the State Department. Below are Nitze's recollections of the dispute between Acheson and Meeker:

> Then, when we got to the question of blockade, that led to a strenuous legal argument between Dean Acheson and Len Meeker....Acheson stated his view unambiguously: "The hell with international law. International law gets made, it's just a series of precedents and decisions that have been made in the past. But this is a unique situation and this is one in which we can, and should, make international law rather than just follow past precedents. There aren't any real precedents for this. And if you're troubled with what the books say about the blockade, then change the name." And then somebody came up with "quarantine."

In the mind of Robert S. McNamara, Kennedy's Secretary of Defense, however, the distinction between a blockade and the measures proposed by Acheson was very real. McNamara viewed the quarantine not as an act of war, but as a diplomatic signal to the Soviets. Below are McNamara's recollections of how he defined the quarantine at the time of the Cuban missile crisis:

> The point was that our quarantine was intended to be a political signal, not a textbook military operation, and trying to get that across to the military caused us all a lot of headaches. For twelve days I lived in the Pentagon, from the 16th to the 27th, because I feared that they might not understand that this was a communications exercise, not a military operation.
>
> One evening, to try to ensure that this difference was understood, I met with the Navy people....We had pinpointed the location of every single Soviet ship approaching the quarantine line, and it was clear one of the ships would reach the line the next day.
>
> I asked Admiral Anderson, "When the ship reaches the line, how are you going to stop it?"
> "We'll hail it," he said.
> "In what language--English or Russian?" I asked.
> "How the hell do I know?" he said, clearly a little agitated by my line of questioning.
> I followed by asking, "What will you do if they don't understand?"
> "I suppose we'll use flags," he replied.
> "Well, what if they don't stop?" I asked.
> "We'll send a shot across the bow," he said.
> "Then what, if that doesn't work?"
> "Then we'll fire into the rudder," he replied, by now clearly very annoyed.
> "You're not going to fire a single shot at anything without my express permission, it that clear?" I said.
>
> That's when he made his famous remark about how the Navy had been running blockades since the days of John Paul Jones, and if I would leave them alone they would run this one successfully as well. I rose from my chair and walked out of the room, saying this was not a blockade but a means of communication between Kennedy and Khrushchev; no force would be applied without my permission; and that would not be given

---

*James G. Blight and David A. Welch, *On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1990).

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

without discussion with the President. "Was that understood?" I asked. The tight-lipped response was "Yes."

The point of all this is that you can't anticipate all the details of any operation. Admiral Anderson was a patriotic American who was only doing his job. But he wanted to use the quarantine in a very precise way for a very precise purpose, and the military had not run a blockade in that way before. The risk of unanticipated things happening out there was very great, and when you're in a situation where you are dealing with the possible eventual use of nuclear weapons, you just cannot afford to take risks which can be avoided.

List of ExComm Members

Lyndon Johnson, Vice President
Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant for National Security
Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Robert Kennedy, Attorney General of the United States
Theodore Sorensen, Presidential Counsel
George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State
U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State
Edward Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America
Rosewell Gilpatrick, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense
John McCone, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
Douglas Dillon, Secretary of Treasury
Pierre Salinger, Presidential Press Secretary
Llewellyn Thompson, Special Adviser for Soviet Affairs

U.S. Nuclear Missile Strategy

On October 25, 1962, Walter Lippmann, a respected journalist for *The New York Times*, wrote an article on how the United States and the Soviet Union could defuse the missile crisis. Lippmann suggested that the United States withdraw its missiles from Turkey in return for a withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky had also proposed this type of exchange. More importantly, the idea found its way into Khrushchev's October 27 letter to President Kennedy.

At the heart of the proposed exchange were the nuclear missiles deployed by the United States in Europe in the mid-1950s to defend NATO. At that time, Soviet conventional forces held a substantial edge over NATO troops in Europe. Soviet bombers were also in a position to attack Europe with nuclear weapons, but their ability to strike the United States itself was limited. The United States, on the other hand, relied on its decisive advantage in nuclear capability to deter a Soviet attack, be it conventional or nuclear. This policy of massive retaliation, announced by Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in 1954, provided for a nuclear response by the United States to defend NATO. Until 1959, the United States deployed missiles only in NATO's "core" areas--West Germany and Great Britain. Worries about the defense of NATO's "southern flank," however, led to a decision to deploy Jupiter and Thor missiles in Italy and Turkey.

Walter Lippmann's article and the comments of Bruno Kreisky served to put U.S. nuclear missiles in NATO countries at the center of the Cuban missile crisis. Officially, the issue for the Kennedy Administration was non-negotiable, but even many opponents of a missile trade were willing to consider the possibility as an alternative to full-scale war. In accordance with the ExComm's consensus, Secretary of State Dean Rusk gave a note to Andrew Cordier, president of Columbia University and former United Nations parliamentarian, at the height of the crisis. In the event war erupted, Cordier was instructed to pass along the message to UN Secretary General U Thant. The note asked the Secretary General to

propose a missile exchange as a solution to the crisis. If the trade were suggested by the United Nations, the United States would have been less open to charges of having deserted NATO, and tensions within the alliance, as well as war, might have been avoided.

As it was, Cordier did not have to deliver the note. Khrushchev accepted Kennedy's offer and a public missile trade never took place. Fifteen Jupiter missiles were removed from Turkey in April 1964, the same time that the Polaris submarine joined the U.S. fleet in the Mediterranean.

Chapter 3

The Cuban Economy

Upon assuming power, Fidel Castro launched a determined campaign to reform the Cuban economy. His plan aimed at agricultural diversification and industrialization under the guidance of central planners in Havana. Sugar, in particular, was identified with the discredited capitalist system and neglected. The results of Castro's economic program were disastrous. Food production fell sharply during the early 1960s, incipient industries never got off the ground, and sugar output declined by almost fifty percent from 1961 to 1963. Meanwhile, Cuba's trade deficit skyrocketed.

Desperate for hard currency, Castro's government in the mid-1960s focused a national crusade on boosting sugar production. Castro made the campaign a yardstick for the success of the revolution, exhorting his people to attain a harvest of ten million tons by 1970. Scarce resources were invested in increasing sugar output. Cane acreage was expanded. Billboards throughout the island asked, "What are you doing toward the ten million?" In fact, the harvest of 1970 did reach a record 8.5 million tons. The disappointment, however, of failing to meet the proclaimed goal damaged the prestige of the revolution. Moreover, the emphasis on industries linked to sugar production left other sectors of the economy crippled.

Castro again shifted his strategy in the early 1970s. Material incentives were reintroduced to spur production, and prices were increased for public services. The educational system concentrated on training technicians, economists, systems analysts, and business administrators. The economy responded by growing at an average annual rate of 5.7 percent during the decade. By the mid-1980s, however, Cuba was suffering many of the symptoms of the stagnation that gripped its Soviet ally. Castro briefly tried market-oriented reforms to reinvigorate Cuba's economy. Individuals were allowed to offer their goods and services on the free market. Agricultural production quickly surged, with farmers' markets springing up throughout the island. The liberalization policy, however, brought sudden wealth to some and jealousy to others. Castro ended the experiment in 1986 and returned again to stressing "moral rewards" for hard work.

Cuba's economic development since the revolution has taken place against the backdrop of its reliance on the Soviet Union. Consequently, the dramatic changes in the Soviet bloc during the Gorbachev era have reverberated ominously in Castro's Cuba. Cuba's trade relations have been particularly hard hit. Even before Gorbachev announced in September 1991 that the Soviets would cut off subsidies to Cuba, Moscow had begun conducting trade with CMEA* members on a hard currency standard based on world market prices. Prior to 1991, East European products, such as machine parts, were either traded for Cuban sugar and citrus fruits or sold to Cuba at reduced prices. With the changes, however, Cubans cannot afford light bulbs from Poland, spare parts for their Hungarian-made busses, or Czech malt for beer.

The Soviet component, of course, has been the most important element of Cuba's economic relations. During the 1980s, Moscow accounted for over two-thirds of Cuba's CMEA trade and provided Cuba with aid constituting almost a quarter of Cuba's economy. This aid came in many forms:

---

*The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) was formed in 1949 to tie the economies of communist countries in Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union. Cuba became a member in 1972.

1. The Soviets paid above-market prices for Cuba's main exports--raw sugar, citrus fruits, and nickel.

2. Cuba re-exported oil supplied by the Soviet Union, earning as much as $500 million annually. During much of the 1980s, re-exported oil was the leading source of hard currency.

3. The Cubans paid rubles for goods that the Soviets had used hard currency to obtain. For example, the Cubans received Canadian wheat flour at ruble prices despite the fact that Moscow originally bought the flour with dollars.

4. The Soviets provided direct aid to Cuba to finance new projects, serve as capital investment, and cover the trade imbalance between the two countries.

5. Soviet loans to the Cubans were based on low, or even zero, interest rates. By 1990, Cuba owed the Soviet Union more than 15.7 billion rubles.

In the late 1980s, Cuba received approximately one-quarter of the twelve billion rubles Moscow annually spent on economic aid. The total annual Soviet aid package to Cuba has been generally valued at four to five billion dollars by the CIA and other sources. Some experts, however, contend that this estimate should be cut in half. They point out that two-thirds of Soviet aid has consisted of manufactured goods, often poorly made and overpriced. Only one-third of the goods Cuba received from Moscow was in the form of petroleum products, and even these did not always reflected market values. For example, Cuba paid ten dollars a barrel above the world price for Soviet oil in late 1989 as a result of the CMEA pricing system.

Nevertheless, oil remains Cuba's most vulnerable point. During the 1980s, Havana relied on the Soviets for three-quarters of its energy supplies, and cutbacks in oil deliveries have been especially painful. Castro has sought to reduce his country's dependency on Soviet oil by enacting strict energy-conservation measures. Drills have been held once a month to highlight methods for reducing energy consumption. Under these exercises, air conditioning is shut down, automobile use is cut, and workers practice doing their jobs manually. This has required accountants to forsake electronic adding machines and forced seamstresses to use sewing machines powered by foot pedals.

Castro has also tried to earn hard currency for Cuba by building special tourist nightclubs and hotels to make the island more attractive to foreign vacationers. While these facilities earn Cuba $200 million a year, they exclude ordinary Cubans lacking hard currency. Resentment has naturally resulted. As one Cuban complained, "The whole purpose of the revolution was to promote equality. Now we have tourists who are more equal than we are."

U.S.-Soviet-Cuban Conflict in Angola

Cuba's involvement in the Angolan civil war was the boldest example of Fidel Castro's efforts to assist communist movements in the Third World. Cuba's role began on a small scale in the early 1970s, with Castro aiding the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in its attempts to overthrow Portuguese colonial rule. Cuba's involvement broadened in 1974 after a new government in Portugal granted Angola independence. With Soviet and Cuban backing, the MPLA seized power but was immediately challenged by two other factions--the Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The FNLA had been receiving small amounts of aid from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), while UNITA was supported by the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), which had been struggling against South Africa for Namibian independence. Meanwhile, China were providing assistance to both the FNLA and UNITA.

The Portuguese tried unsuccessfully in 1975 to schedule elections under a coalition government but geopolitical tensions frustrated a solution. Instead, the CIA increased covert funding and China sent 120 advisers to help the FNLA, while the Soviets backed the MPLA. Castro also boosted Cuba's support of the MPLA, sending 320 advisers to Angola. Helping the MPLA allowed Castro to compete with the

Chinese in the arena of Third World politics. If the MPLA succeeded, future Third World socialists would be more likely to turn to the Cuban-Soviet alliance rather than to the Chinese. Castro's prestige as the leader of the Nonaligned Movement and Cuba's bid for Third World superpower status were at stake. Not surprisingly, the United States strongly opposed the spread of Cuban influence in Africa. Washington directed nearly $30 million in covert funds to combat the MPLA. By the fall of 1975, the FNLA and UNITA had combined their forces. This new alliance received help from more than 2,000 South African troops. The MPLA was severely weakened by the new united opposition and called upon Fidel Castro for still more help. Cuba responded by sending several hundred advisers and military specialists to Angola in late October. In November, Castro launched Operation Carlota, an airlift of Cuban troops aboard Soviet planes. By the end of January 1976, over 10,000 Cuban soldiers were in Angola. At the same time, the MPLA gained another unexpected advantage when the U.S. Senate, in the wake of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal, banned all aid to Angola.

With its enemies struggling for support and Cuban troops on its side, the MPLA proclaimed Angola a socialist people's republic. The MPLA's declaration, however, did not bring lasting peace. Despite Soviet urging, the government of Agostinho Neto declined to nationalize industry, including an American-owned Gulf Oil refinery located on Angola's coast. Castro did not take issue with these economic policies, but the Soviets backed a proponent for the nationalization of all industry, Minister of the Interior Nito Alves. Alves was soon removed from office and, in May 1977, made an armed bid for power. Cuban troops sided with the government in stopping Alves' coup attempt. Needless to say, this turn of events did not help Soviet-Cuban relations.

In addition, the MPLA was troubled by the resurgence of UNITA. UNITA received support not only from dissatisfied Angolans, but also enjoyed the backing of South Africa. For their part, the South Africans were already caught up in a struggle against SWAPO for control of Namibia. An alliance with UNITA allowed them to pursue SWAPO units into Angola and also strike a blow against Castro's plans for Third World revolution. With forces from Cuba, South Africa, the MPLA, SWAPO, and UNITA involved in Angola, a low-intensity civil war dragged on throughout the 1980s. In 1986, the United States renewed its support for UNITA, making the war even more costly for the Cubans. Moreover, Angolan resentment toward the Cuban presence was emerging. Nationalists in Angola wanted to develop their country without foreign interference. Meanwhile, the civil war was tearing the countryside apart and Angolan debts to Castro were spiraling out of control.

Under Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviets began to change their outlook toward southwest Africa. The Angolan civil war was not only proving expensive but was also an impediment to better relations with the United States. In short, by the mid-1980s all parties in the Angolan conflict had reason to consider a settlement. The United States took the initiative and proposed a gradual Cuban withdrawal from Angola in exchange for a South African withdrawal from Namibia with guarantees for Namibian independence. This plan allowed Castro to end Cuba's involvement in Angola while still laying claim to the liberation of Namibia from South Africa. After intense negotiations in the fall of 1988, South Africa agreed to leave Namibia, and Cuba agreed to gradually withdraw its 50,000 soldiers from Angola. In May 1991, the MPLA and UNITA agreed to end the civil war that had claimed 300,000 lives. The Cubans kept their part of the agreement by withdrawing their troops ahead of schedule. At the same time, the MPLA abandoned its

Collapse of the Soviet-Cuban Alliance

The failure of the hard-line coup in the Soviet Union in August 1991 greatly accelerated the change that has taken place in Cuban-Soviet relations since the late 1980s. Many of the coup plotters were in fact the strongest Soviet advocates of support for the Castro regime. Moreover, the collapse of the coup hastened the decline of central power in the Soviet Union while bolstering the authority of republic leaders, particularly Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Prior to the coup, Yeltsin had called on Moscow to drastically reduce its international presence and had demanded a greater voice for the republics in the allocation of foreign aid.

Supplementary Notes

In September 1991, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev adopted many of the tenets of Yeltsin's proposed foreign policy with respect to Cuba. After meeting with Secretary of State James A. Baker 3rd on September 11, Gorbachev announced Soviet plans to withdraw 11,000 military personnel from Cuba and base Soviet-Cuban economic relations on the principles of free trade. Gorbachev also implied that Moscow would phase out arms sales to Havana.

At the time of Gorbachev's announcement, Soviet forces in Cuba included intelligence officers, advisers, and a rifle brigade. Moscow's military relationship with the regime of Fidel Castro began in September 1960, when Nikita Khrushchev sent the first group of Soviet advisers to Cuba. In August 1962, 40,000 Soviet troops arrived in connection with Khrushchev's plans to install nuclear missiles on the island. Even after the missiles were withdrawn, the Soviets left behind a combat brigade.

U.S. officials have indicated that they approve of the changes in Soviet-Cuban relations. Gorbachev's statement on Cuba dovetailed with Soviet efforts to remove other regional disputes, such as Afghanistan, from the U.S.-Soviet agenda. The Bush Administration had previously linked U.S. assistance to Moscow with the withdrawal of Soviet military personnel from Cuba and the cutoff of aid to the Castro regime. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney suggested that without Soviet aid, Castro's "own days may be numbered." With economic conditions in Cuba deteriorating, Washington has been concerned that the United States may be overwhelmed by a flood of Cuban refugees. Fears of another "Mariel exodus" led U.S. officials in 1991 to temporarily suspend the processing of visa applications for Cubans wishing to visit the United States.

As expected, Cuba reacted with indignation to Gorbachev's announcement, noting bitterly that Havana had not been consulted before the Soviet decision. The Cuban military has relied heavily on Moscow to provide weapons, technical support, and intelligence. The Cuban armed forces are estimated to include 180,500 soldiers on active duty--by far the largest force in the Caribbean and Central America.

Faced with the withdrawal of Soviet military personnel from the island, a statement by the Cuban foreign ministry on September 14, 1991, called for the simultaneous withdrawal of American forces from the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay. In drawing the parallel between 1962 and 1991, the Castro government acknowledged that the island's communist system was again fighting for its survival. The foreign ministry statement also raised concerns that Cuban-Americans would press the Russian republic to join the economic embargo against Cuba. Below are passages excerpted from the Cuban statement:

> In view of the events now unfolding and of our situation, we now have a notion regarding the oft-involved new world order which follows a logic of subordination to the dictates of the United States. With the maturity and realism which we have gained from more than thirty years of confronting the aggressive designs of U.S. imperialism, we have tried to discern the way in which the historical, political and moral responsibilities of the USSR will be met in the future. To this point we must add our own experience: we have loyally followed certain principles, principles which one cannot abandon without renouncing what one was at the time of adopting them: we rejected all the pressures and even what several U.S. administrations offered us in return for our forswearing and breaking off our close links with the Soviet Union. We were always firm and faithful in fulfilling our commitments. No state, large or small, and even less a great power (regardless of its leadership) can abandon the legitimate and historic agreements and commitments that it has made.
>
> It is overwhelming, and a source of indignation, to think that we are marching toward a world order in which the little countries of the Third World, like Cuba, whose social systems do not please the United States, will have no choice but to submit or run the risk of disappearing. A world order where there will be no room, not just for ideological loyalties, but no room even for the most basic ethical principles. The loss of such principles will entail a threat to our civilization that could result from the predominance of a new barbarism, arising from the technological prowess and hegemonic delirium of the United States.
>
> Nevertheless, we continue to believe in peoples and in the future. We do not owe what our country represents today to hesitation or capitulation. Faced with the prepotent hubris of the empire and with the difficulties which have arisen in our relationship with the USSR, we chose dignity and self-respect, without deluding ourselves: we know that our material resources are more limited and we know that we will be forced to make truly heroic and superhuman efforts, but we are willing to face the consequences of a position of principle.